GPS Backup Finally Moving Closer
There is a growing consensus in the United States and Europe that entire economies are overly dependent on GPS and analogous forms of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). All forms of navigation (aviation, motor vehicle, maritime, etc.) depend on GNSS. GNSS precise timing signals underlie global telecommunications networks, banking transactions, electric transmission systems, and numerous other applications. It’s not just an aviation problem, and an aviation-only solution is a diversion from solving the overall problem.
In this country, the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation jointly developed the National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Architecture, which envisions multiple sources for these three vital functions. Last year, DOD went further, releasing its own PNT strategy document in August 2019. DOD envisions three layers: a global layer of GNSS, a regional layer based on terrestrial technologies such as eLoran, and a local layer using a variety of other technologies. The European Space Agency has developed a backup architecture for United Kingdom maritime commerce. The MarRINav report produced a hybrid approach using GNSS, eLoran, and short-range R-mode VDES.
In the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018, Congress required DOT to test a variety of terrestrial precise-timing systems to back up GPS timing signals. Such systems were to be expandable to provide navigation services. As Bill Carey reported in Aviation Week (Nov. 9-22, 2020), DOT’s field tests of 11 such systems were carried out in March at two facilities—NASA Langley in Virginia and a Volpe National Transportation Systems Center facility in Massachusetts. Carey reports that as of late October, DOT’s analysis of the results had completed an interagency technical review, but there is not yet a projected release date for DOT’s report on the demonstrations.
Carey talked with people from some of the companies that took part, including two whose proposed systems are based on eLoran—UrsaNav and Hellen Systems. He summarized their proposed roll-out plans for PNT systems based on that technology, emphasizing the merits of a signal vastly stronger than that of GPS and in an entirely different part of the spectrum. Hellen Systems estimates that it could refurbish the 19 legacy Loran-C transmitter sites over a several-year period for $300-400 million, less than the cost of a single GPS III satellite. Their team includes L3Harris Technologies, which operates the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) ground network for FAA.
Carey’s article also notes that FAA’s current Navigation Roadmap remains increasingly dependent on GPS. For example, it is counting on the expanded use of GPS-based wide-area augmentation system (WAAS) for airport landing systems, refusing to invest in the latest generation of instrument landing systems (ILS) that are far more effective than legacy ILS. The same course is being followed in Europe via the expanded use of GNSS-dependent European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) for landing systems. (Note: I discussed FAA resistance to new-generation ILS in “A Rebirth for Instrument Landing Systems?” in the March 2020 issue of this newsletter.)
FAA continues to focus on an aviation-only approach to GPS backup, including a reversal of the original NextGen plan to phase out legacy VOR ground stations in order to retain a minimum operational network of about 600 by 2030. That plus an expanded network of distance measuring equipment (DME) ground stations will provide an emergency capability to enable aircraft to keep flying in the event of a serious GPS failure. Far better would be a robust multi-layer, economy-wide PNT capability, as called for by Congress and the National PNT Architecture. DOT should require FAA to get with that program, rather than continuing to focus on a crude aviation-only GPS backup.