Tug Aground-Sank Northern B.C.

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Most of us didn't look at it as a positive thing, and I just relate it here for purposes of discussion. I even remember when my dad was working at the same company as mate and they wanted him to paint the back of the wheelhouse, while on watch! He refused, told the skipper if you want me to paint, fine, put me on deck, but not when I am supposed to be on watch. My dad took navigation very seriously, as did I when I was in the wheelhouse.
 
He refused,
That's the problem. From my estimation about 20% don't follow that rule. The larger problem is some of the trainees don't get it either. Old habits and old trained thoughts don't agree with modern logical thoughts.... Even though I am an 'old pharte'!
 
There are so many different issues being discussed and intertwined here.

1-The legal requirements for training and manning.

vs.

2-The best practices for same.

vs.

3-Olden days and what one has gotten by with.

We should all push for 2-best practices and ultimately to have 1 become the same as 2. What one has done in the past and gotten by with should not influence what we do today.

However, that leads us to

4-Response and containment.

Even taking all possible steps and tightening rules, there are going to be fuel leaks over time. In this case, there was not a plan nor were their resources available to address that. The same incident in many areas we boat would have immediately had people on the scene, properly trained and equipped and the fuel and other chemicals contained.

This needs to be addressed from both directions. First, training and staffing to avoid such incidents. Second, response to such incidents, understanding that they will still occur.

Failure to address these issues leads to what may well be a bad solution, that of banning the vessels from the area.
 
At the risk of sending this thread off to the deep end...perhaps Canada should take a page out Trump's campaign and set up toll/inspection stations at every narrows on the Inside Passage :D


The real cross border maritime issues are those involving the Great Lakes and St Lawrence Seaway. Yes, what happens in one's BC backyard can be galling. With the thousands of factories, tugs, barges, freighters "plying" these eastern Canada and US lakes and channels on a daily basis under a complex set of multi government rules and regulations, troubles do and often occur.

In the current thread case, what happened is simple and tragic. Changing rules and regs will be challenged based upon maritime law and agreements and last a long time. But one huge recourse the natives and BC have is to sue the barge company big time for monetary damages This would have a ripple effect across the industry on both sides of the border.

Fuel and supplies are moved by BC barge companies along the BC coast as well. Single handed and/or with minimal crew to boot. Wake them up, a big damages lawsuit covering any and all transporters may indeed be the key. But as always, be careful what you ask for ------ :facepalm:
 
B&B
In regards to your number 4; I don't recall the Canadian requirement, but any Tank Vessel or Non-Tank Vessel, US Flag or Foreign Flag, entering US waters must have an approve Spill Response Plan. Part of that plan is the Plan Holder must have a contract with a oil response contractor who can respond to a spill in a specified amount of time. The maximum response time, I believe, is 24 hours. They also are required to have a COFR (certificate of financial responsibility) to cover the costs of clean ups. Most ocean going ships and barges carry $1Billion in P&I insurance and coastal barges usually carry $200Million of P&I as well.
 
B&B
In regards to your number 4; I don't recall the Canadian requirement, but any Tank Vessel or Non-Tank Vessel, US Flag or Foreign Flag, entering US waters must have an approve Spill Response Plan. Part of that plan is the Plan Holder must have a contract with a oil response contractor who can respond to a spill in a specified amount of time. The maximum response time, I believe, is 24 hours. They also are required to have a COFR (certificate of financial responsibility) to cover the costs of clean ups. Most ocean going ships and barges carry $1Billion in P&I insurance and coastal barges usually carry $200Million of P&I as well.

Well, 18-24 hours is too long to wait to start. On the East Coast of the US, you'd have someone on site in under 2 hours. For that part of the job too, the USCG doesn't wait for the owner to respond. They get any oil or fuel cleaning immediately. They don't care about the boat, other than it not being a hazard to navigation. Yes, the Vessel should have a response plan but it's best that regardless of them, containment of the spill take place immediately. All the insurance in the world doesn't undo the damage and in this case and many the damage is physical but also a threat to the continued use of the waterways.
 
One big difference between the east coast US and BC is the near total absence of settlement. Bella Bella is probably the most populated area between the end of Vancouver island and Prince Rupert. It's no excuse in this case since Bella Bella was around the corner, but in many areas a stranded and leaking vessel would be 100 miles or more away from port where a response team could practically be located.

It's a tough problem. Sending barges outside gets them further away from shore, but probably increases the risk of problems in the first place.
 
B&B You are absolutely correct. Response time is usually immediate. The maximum time is for hard to reach locales without much in the way of infrastructure. It is in the best interest of ANY company to respond timely and positively. You do not want the USCG to manage a spill! It is not a matter of having a response plan, IT IS REQUIRED to have one. The approved plan and COFR are required or you don't get to trade in the US. I agree about the damage and the continued threat, but at this time it is the safest way to move bulk petroleum products. The reduction of the amount of petroleum product spilled since OPA 1990 was introduced is dramatic. That does not lessen the effect of this event or any other spill. The amount needs to be ZERO. The lessons learned from this will hopefully further improve the carriage of waterborne petroleum products.


I drove oil tankers (small product tankers and VLCC's) around for over 30 years. The requirements on the ships, crews and terminals is never ending and has made significant improvements in the industry. As this tragedy points out, as in any incident, there is always room for improvement.
 
I'm not arguing over what the requirements are. I'm just saying that sometimes people don't meet the requirements and there needs to be an alternate plan and I do recognize the distances in the area but they are a given that the required plan needs to address. There are ways to reduce the risk. I hope they work together to find them. This event wasn't handled as well as they need to be.
 
Sorry if I am too late to the discussion, as I have not had a good wifi for almost a week. What I get from the latest series of posts on this thread suggests a lot of uninformed speculation.

Do we know what manning was actually in place on the NES?
Do we actually know what the requirements are for a foreign tug in Canadian waters?
Do we know if the NES was actually in compliance with the regs in place?

I have seen nothing here that suggests we actually know the answers to any of these Qs.

I hope the TSB report is out sooner, rather than later, to put this speculation to rest.
 
Sorry if I am too late to the discussion, as I have not had a good wifi for almost a week. What I get from the latest series of posts on this thread suggests a lot of uninformed speculation.

Facts? Where is the fun in that? ;)
 
See post #20 last sentence for jumping to conclusions or applying rules, regs, best practices, etc......when they don't apply or are voluntary. :D
 
Ka Sea ta,
Crews of any kind of vessel "screw up" causing accidents. Huge variations of risk result from good oversight or lack of same.
IMO there should be much more oversight on vessels carrying large quanites of oil. The oil accidents just keep happening and for obvious reasons. It's only going to cost money to nearly fix the problem.

Don't make an international incident out of it as if a Canadian vessel spilled lots of oil in the San Juan Is it would be the same.

And there will soon be very little farm land in the Skagit area as a result of too many people but almost nothing is being done about it. I'm often with the special interest groups. Not usually though. But the steady increase in people and the economic and destructive machine they have will obviously consume the earth if things continue as they are. Or perhaps nature will consume humans before then but things will definitely get worse before they get better ..... IF EVER.
Hey Eric, rereading some of this thread and saw your earlier remark about too many people in Skagit Co. and nothing being done it about it. Just wondering if you had any suggestions on what do to about all these people, LOL!:dance:
 
See post #20 last sentence for jumping to conclusions or applying rules, regs, best practices, etc......when they don't apply or are voluntary. :D
Nothing is voluntary in the commercial world. Even on 'lowly' tugboats. But the traditions and habits are hard to break. Even when knowing what you 'should do' is overridden by what others do.
 
Do we know what manning was actually in place on the NES?
Do we actually know what the requirements are for a foreign tug in Canadian waters?
Do we know if the NES was actually in compliance with the regs in place?
The answers to your queries are 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. Yes. The normal watch standing hours are either 6 on, 6 off, or for certain vessels 4 on, 8 off. Industry wide the normal watch change hours are 0600, 1200, 1800 and 2400 for 6 and 6. (or 0400, 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400 for 4 and 8.) So either way, this incident occurred an hour 15 after assuming the watch. Canada cannot 'mandate' different watch standing requirements on foreign vessels. The vessels are supposed to observe international requirements. (that's the crux of the issue) Tugs are in a grey area with no foreign equivalent for manning)

And your last question is so simplistic it begs answering. If the NES was in compliance (providing an adequate lookout while underway) then this incident would NOT have occurred. (Even IF one can 'act' as their own lookout while navigating, that is hard do accomplish while eyes are shut.) If the interaction between the navigation officer and a separate lookout was even present that would be enough (IMHO) to prevent just about all these types of incidents.

There are two distinct types of groundings. Powered and Unpowered.
They are said to be this way because they have the distinction of being 'driven aground' which almost always entails human error. And unpowered groundings which could (but there are exceptions) be caused by mother nature.

Looking at the shot of the NES wheels it is evident which kind of grounding this was. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to divine the truth. Waiting for the NTSB report will be like waiting for jello to set up. You 'know' what the result will be. But is it necessary to wait to see it happen?

Regarding the Canadian rules, try looking at this link. https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/TVNCOE/documents/toolbag/UTVGUIDEBOOK.pdf Look on page 18 for the paragraph with this content: A helmsman cannot stand as his own lookout.

However..... the tonnage of the NES allows it not be required to follow SOLAS regs. So back at the original conundrum. What 'should be followed' (using prudent seamanship) is not required to be followed by law. ANY law From any organization. Also, GT is a US measurement. Tonnage or ITC International Tonnage is different. The regs are parsed to refer to GT not ITC. Go figure. BUT once a vessel exceeds 200 GT, ALL the higher level laws pertain to manning, equipment and solas. Unfortunately the NES was one (of many) rule beaters that fall between the cracks of the regs.
 
A lot of vessels that would be over 200 gross tons can legally stay under that by the addition of tonnage ports which are bolt on plates strategically placed on the boat, thus keeping it "under tonnage", which is how many tugs and fish boats (all the tugs I worked on) are able to "get away" with lesser manning requirements. BTW, there is no such time as 2400 hours. Midnight is 0000 hours in military or maritime time. I am sure you know that but for those that see all those stupid hospital clocks that say 2400, there is no such time. I learned that very early on when standing anchor watch on my dads tug one night and entered 2400 in the log book and got promptly corrected!
 
cappy208 said:
The normal watch standing hours are either 6 on, 6 off, or for certain vessels 4 on, 8 off. Industry wide the normal watch change hours are 0600, 1200, 1800 and 2400 for 6 and 6. (or 0400, 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400 for 4 and 8.) So either way, this incident occurred an hour 15 after assuming the watch.
With that cappy, you are assuming that they were following some "normal" change routine and that a change actually took place.

Our tugs that drag sticks a couple hundred miles down the coast, sometimes hitched to a pin for days waiting on weather, might adjust the change times according to when they start the next leg. Not often, because continuity is key, but it does happen.

In the case of the NES, I'm interested in knowing what the qualifications were of the 7 crew members. IF they were all crew...
 
@ 78 Puget-trawler. Strangely enough I noticed 10 (or so) years ago that several companies started having naval architects 're design' the tugs to UP (??) the measurements. What was previously below 100 GT was 'miraculously' re admeasured above 100. I am not privy to the why's. But the end result was a bunch of tugs with the 'tonnage doors' you described being suddenly over 100. But they almost always try to skew the measurements to below 200 GT.

I was caught in this dilemma years ago when riding for pilot trips on a 2205 ton ferry. It took me several months to accrue the necessary trips to be able to apply to sit for the exam. When I got to the USCG office they took the paperwork and then denied me. The reason was: the vessel I rode on had been 're admeasured' to 1488 tons. The threshold for qualifying trips was 1600GT.
So, even though my trips were done when the vessel was 'over 1600GT', by the time I applied the vessel was under 1600. I had no where else to turn to get trips. This admeasurement BS is silly. I remember reading books with the 'old' vessels being 2500, 3000, or even 5000 GT. And they were small tramp steamers or small sailing vessels. My how things change!
 
With that cappy, you are assuming that they were following some "normal" change routine and that a change actually took place.

Our tugs that drag sticks a couple hundred miles down the coast, sometimes hitched to a pin for days waiting on weather, might adjust the change times according to when they start the next leg. Not often, because continuity is key, but it does happen.

In the case of the NES, I'm interested in knowing what the qualifications were of the 7 crew members. IF they were all crew...
I can almost guarantee that while there may have been a guest on board which is not all that unusual, that the crew was all crew. Likely had at least two and probably more licenses on board, but I don't know what kind of watches they stand. I would also bet they kept standard watchs of either 6 and 6 or 4 and 8. In other words I seriously doubt that this is some loose knit operation. Log tugs may operate a little bit more flexible as you describe, but not these guys. We may never know who screwed up but crew manning is likely not the issue here. I remember once being on a tug up in the Bering Sea and the only guy on the boat who didn't have a 200/200 tug license was the cook!
 
With that cappy, you are assuming that they were following some "normal" change routine and that a change actually took place.


In the case of the NES, I'm interested in knowing what the qualifications were of the 7 crew members. IF they were all crew...
Partially assuming. It has been my experience that oil transportation companies follow a more rigid watch schedule, 'recency' enforcement and pilotage policy than 'stick, stone or mom and pop boats, do. Kirby has tried to follow the rules. The major oil companies who charter these transportation companies won't hire them if they do not follow the rules. I work for a direct competitor for Kirby. I am vetted twice a year by outside auditors to measure compliance. These audits cover the Master, Mate, Engineer, Deckhands, Wheelhouse and Engine Room. I am certain the NES met all applicable criteria. My thoughts stem from the rules that 'aren't in place (but should be.)
 
I like your input on this thread cappy.
It's relevant and you do a good job trying to explain the tonnage maze.
:thumb:
 
It's probably worth repeating that even though the legal licensing requirement for the NES would be a 200T Masters, Kirby has a company policy requiring a minimum 1600T license. This doesn't address any loop holes that might exist, but at least Kirby has higher-than-required licensing for their watch standers. But clearly that doesn't keep them from falling asleep.
 
Reducing this a bit to the very basics of safety in the workplace. Even the best people make mistakes, have accidents. Good safety practices are designed to minimize the likelihood of those mistakes leading to accidents and provide protection against that. This may be done due to government regulations or just company policy. When an accident occurs then it's a combination of both human error and of a breakdown in following the company rules and practices. We develop safeguards knowing humans will make err.

Most accidents then are the result of human error and failure to use best practices to protect against those errors.
 
BandB; said:
Most accidents then are the result of human error and failure to use best practices to protect against those errors.
Is manipulating tonnage then lobbying for special treatment and exemptions, "best practices?"
 
Is manipulating tonnage then lobbying for special treatment and exemptions, "best practices?"

If it impacts safety, I would say not. At some point, every company in every industry has to make a choice on safety and it's importance to them. Often they'll choose cost over safety which is why we have to have regulations and enforcement to prevent that.

Automobiles are a simple example. We drive the safest cars we ever have today. Only because of regulation. No auto manufacturer could have afforded building safer cars if their competitor wasn't required to do the same.

Not speaking as to this situation since we don't have all the facts, but when companies violate regulations and encourage or force bad practices and that results in death or injury, I'd like to see far more criminal charges filed against the companies and their executives, not just civil cases. In my mind if you routinely do things that put persons at unnecessary risk and in violation of regulations or sound practices, that's a crime. I would also like to see whistleblower protection strengthened. Today, an employee complains and they find themselves jobless before they can fully blow the whistle and get protection. They may win in court 10 years from now, but their family will have suffered terribly all that time.

Just look at all those who tried to stop and expose Wells Fargo. Go back to Enron and talk about the accountants in Arthur Andersen who tried to stop it. You could say that wasn't life and death, but say that to the retirees who lost everything.

Ultimately we all have to make individual choices too. It's not easy.


 
Is manipulating tonnage then lobbying for special treatment and exemptions, "best practices?"
What difference does it make, especially when its known apparently that they're min license is 1600 tons and it had adequate manning? We don't know for sure what actually happened but if it was a case of falling asleep, then it hardly matters how the tugs tonnage was rated does it?
 
What difference does it make, especially when its known apparently that they're min license is 1600 tons and it had adequate manning? We don't know for sure what actually happened but if it was a case of falling asleep, then it hardly matters how the tugs tonnage was rated does it?

I think "adequate manning" is the key here. The boat had the "required" manning, but I would argue that it's inadequate to ensure safety. I think if two people were required for a watch, with duties split up in some way, a huge portion of the "falling asleep" accidents would go away, including this one. But that would double the size of the crew with watch-keeping duties, so negatively effect the economics of operating.
 
Is manipulating tonnage then lobbying for special treatment and exemptions, "best practices?"

It is with respect to the profitability of the tug company. It's not with respect to safety. The only way to get safety factored into business decisions is to somehow represent them in the costs of doing business. That happens through insurance premiums, regulations, or the cost of litigation.
 
78puget-trawler; said:
We don't know for sure what actually happened but if it was a case of falling asleep, then it hardly matters how the tugs tonnage was rated does it?
It does matter if slight of hand was used to fudge the manning. A pilot may not have made the difference but it could have lowered the odds.

In so many areas of life, when an "accident" happens, it is highly unlikely the behavior leading up to it was a first time occurrence.

Hey, maybe just a bad batch of chili took the second pair of eyes away.
 
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