Reply
 
Thread Tools Search this Thread Display Modes
 
Old 08-13-2020, 08:34 PM   #1
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
An interesting read on the security of GPS

This article reinforces my decision to continue to carry at least a minimal suite of paper charts and the skills and tools to use them.

From the New Yorker, August 6, 2020

How Vulnerable is GPS?

How Vulnerable Is G.P.S.?

In the cool, dark hours after midnight on June 20, 2012, Todd Humphreys made the final preparations for his attack on the Global Positioning System. He stood alone in the middle of White Sands Missile Range, in southern New Mexico, sixty miles north of Juárez. All around him were the glowing gypsum dunes of the Chihuahuan Desert. In the distance, the snow-capped San Andres Mountains loomed.
On a hill about a kilometre away, his team was gathered around a flat metal box the size of a carry-on suitcase. The electronic machinery inside the box was called a spoofer—a weapon by another name. Soon, a Hornet Mini, a drone-operated helicopter popular with law-enforcement and rescue agencies, was scheduled to appear forty feet above them. Then the spoofer would be put to the test.
Humphreys, an engineering professor at the University of Texas at Austin, had been working on this spoofing technology for years, but he was nervous. Witnessing the test that morning was a group of about fifteen officials from the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Air Force’s 746th Test Squadron. They were Humphreys’s hosts, but they very much wanted him to fail. His success would mean a major reckoning for the entire G.P.S. system—and, in turn, for the effectiveness of some of the country’s principal military and defense systems. Drones, which rely on G.P.S. to navigate, are an increasingly indispensable part of our security apparatus. Demand for them is growing elsewhere, too. There are now over a million more recreational drones in the sky than there were just four years ago. Sales of high-precision commercial-grade drones—for everything from pipeline inspections to 3-D mapping—increased more than five hundred per cent during the same period.
When D.H.S. had first contacted Humphreys a few months earlier, the department was worried about one kind of G.P.S. vulnerability in particular—a disruption to the system called jamming. By transmitting interference, jammers are able to overwhelm a G.P.S. signal and render a drone’s receiver inoperable. There’s no great mystery about how jamming works, but D.H.S. approached Humphreys because it wanted to test the technology in action: Would he be interested in helping with a demonstration?
Humphreys accepted the invitation right away, then told the officials that he wanted to focus on a different, more sophisticated threat. In 2011, Iran had made headlines by successfully capturing a C.I.A. drone about a hundred miles from the border with Afghanistan. No one had been sure how the seizure happened: jamming could disorient a drone but not take it over. Humphreys suggested that Iran had succeeded by spoofing the signal—not just interfering with it but actually replacing it with a phantom G.P.S. signal. Tricked into trusting the false system, aircraft could then be commandeered and captured. “Let’s try something more ambitious,” Humphreys told D.H.S. He would see whether he could down a drone.
Humphreys, now forty-five, has a gee-whiz fascination with the scientific world that can make him seem younger than he is. He’s earnest and telegenic; you can imagine him hosting a PBS kids’ show that launches a million STEM majors. A Utah native, Humphreys had planned to be a patent attorney. But, as an intern at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, he listened to a NASA lawyer discussing an upcoming patent and realized that he wanted to be the one inventing things, not approving the inventions. “I thought, Why would I want to be on his side of the table? He’s just taking notes,” Humphreys told me. Humphreys got interested in G.P.S. while he was an engineering grad student at Cornell. He’d been studying software-defined radio—the processing of radio waves by computer software, rather than traditional hardware—and began to wonder whether his research could be used to build a brand-new kind of G.P.S. receiver.
G.P.S. is owned by the Department of Defense, operated by the Air Force from a heavily secured room at a base in Colorado, and available for free to anyone in the world. There are twenty-four active G.P.S. satellites, orbiting at twenty thousand kilometres, each one emitting a radio signal that contains a timecode and a description of the satellite’s exact position. By measuring the transmission time of the signal, a G.P.S. receiver determines its distance from the satellite. If the receiver does this simultaneously with the signals of at least four satellites in its line of sight, it can extrapolate its position in three dimensions. During the roughly sixty-seven milliseconds the signal takes to reach us, it grows exceedingly faint. The task of receiving the signal and extracting its informational component is often compared to trying to read using a light bulb in a different city.
The core technology of this system has remained the same since the first G.P.S. satellite was launched, in 1977, but its uses have proliferated at an astonishing speed. Although the Air Force oversees satellites that transmit signals, once those signals are broadcast into the world, they belong to everyone. Because G.P.S. is a “passive” system—meaning it merely requires a user to receive a signal, not transmit one—it can handle infinite growth. The number of G.P.S. receivers could double tomorrow without affecting the underlying infrastructure at all. From improving maps to measuring the minute movement of tectonic plates, people have devised more ingenious uses for the G.P.S. signal than the system’s original architects could ever have imagined. Humphreys is one such innovator.
Test day at White Sands was the first time Humphreys’s team had used the spoofer outside the lab: because transmitting a fake G.P.S. signal is illegal, they had never even done a full dress rehearsal. For Humphreys, who made money in college as a magician at children’s parties, it felt like premièring a difficult trick without any practice. Around two A.M., the Hornet appeared, hovering forty feet above the missile range. Humphreys spoke a code word into his handheld radio: “Lightning.” Up on the hill, his students switched on the spoofer. Gradually increasing its power, they directed the bogus signal toward the Hornet, which appeared to hesitate in midair, as if encountering an invisible obstacle. The spoofer was, in essence, whispering lies in the drone’s ear, feeding it inaccurate information about its location. Convinced that it had drifted upward, the drone tried to correct, beginning a steep dive toward the desert floor. Just as it was about to crash into the ground, a manual operator grabbed the controls, pulling the Hornet out of its nosedive. Humphreys’s team let out a celebratory whoop over the radio.
“We were the only ones clapping,” he told me recently. His hosts looked grim. When Humphreys wasted no time spreading the word about the spoofer’s achievement, they were even more displeased. “I’m told I’ll never be invited back,” he said. “They probably thought I’d do a sleepy presentation in an academic journal. But I was looking to communicate to the world what I thought was an alarming situation.”
Since the G.P.S. program began, in 1973, its satellite signals have been a source of controversy. It was the brainchild of an Air Force colonel named Bradford Parkinson, who, disillusioned by the indiscriminate air campaigns of the Vietnam War, imagined G.P.S. as a way to improve the accuracy of precision bombing. Parkinson’s research team designed two versions of the G.P.S. signal, one for civilian use and another, with tighter security protocols and more precise readings, for the military. But when the first G.P.S. satellites were launched, it quickly became clear that the civilian signal was more accurate than its architects had intended. And shrewd scientists discovered that although the military signal’s informational content was heavily encrypted, picking up the radio signal itself wasn’t difficult. It was like gleaning information about a sealed letter by looking at the envelope’s postmark.


In the nineties, the Pentagon intentionally corrupted the civilian signal—a practice known as “selective availability”—hoping to thwart terrorists or other bad actors who might otherwise use the signal to launch precision attacks on U.S. assets. But here, too, users found workarounds, and an order from President Bill Clinton, which took effect in 2000, halted the Pentagon’s program. G.P.S. could now be used to its full potential.
Soon, the civilian G.P.S. industry was flourishing. By the middle of the decade, Garmin, a leading consumer-G.P.S. company, posted more than $1.6 billion in sales. Car units were proliferating at an annual rate of more than a hundred and forty per cent. The in-car G.P.S. boom gave way, of course, to the smartphone boom: G.P.S. was now something you carried with you always. But the explosive growth of the civilian G.P.S. market also incentivized attempts to corrupt the signal. These days, pocket-sized G.P.S. jammers go for a few hundred dollars each on the Internet and offer an easy out for anyone worried about, say, a surveilling employer. A few years ago, so many truck drivers on the New Jersey Turnpike were using jammers to thwart their bosses’ tracking programs that spillover interference eventually disrupted the G.P.S.-based landing system at Newark Liberty International Airport.
G.P.S. is now crucially important for reasons that are unrelated to providing geolocation. Because the G.P.S. clocks are synchronized to within nanoseconds, the network’s signals are used to unify time-dependent systems spread over large areas. G.P.S. time helps bounce calls between cellular towers, regulate power flows in electrical grids, and time-stamp financial trades on the major exchanges. If a spoofer were to feed erroneous information that confused the clocks in even a few nodes of these systems, the damage could be widespread: as time errors multiply, communications systems could fail, wrongly apportioned power flows could result in blackouts, and automated trading programs could yank themselves out of the markets, causing crashes. And those are just a few scenarios. We still have not figured out exactly how to safeguard a technology that is so crucial yet so porous.
In 2001, the Department of Transportation released a report warning that G.P.S. could become a “tempting target” for enemies of the U.S. The joint study was the first official acknowledgment that spoofing was a real and significant threat. Humphreys heard about the report while at Cornell. The worst-case spoofing scenario it described seemed like something he could do himself—in fact, like something he could do better himself.
Humphreys suspected that these early, crude attempts at spoofing would be easy to detect and thwart. The real threat, he thought, would come from software-defined spoofers, which would be more powerful and more subtle. Traditional receivers rely on G.P.S. chips, which makes them fast but relatively inflexible: you can only change the physical hardware so much. By relying on code instead, software-defined receivers can be infinitely adaptable. Humphreys set about trying to build one. The finished model took years to perfect—“a real beast,” Humphreys called it—partly because he couldn’t perform any real tests on it without breaking the law. He began work on the spoofer at Cornell and finished it with the help of his students at the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas. It was this same device, contained in the metal luggage-like box, that took down the Hornet in White Sands.
In the months following this début demo, Humphreys kept testing the spoofer, generating an ever-longer list of its capabilities: it could override the timing systems used by mobile-phone networks, electrical grids, and trading programs. The initial good news was that Humphreys probably had one of the only software-defined spoofers in the world. For a few years, the F.B.I. regularly visited his office to insure that he was keeping his creation secure. Humphreys was happy to comply—he didn’t want the technology spreading any more than the F.B.I. did—but, by 2016, code for software-defined G.P.S. spoofers was appearing online, at security conferences, and at hacker conventions.
Then, as if to underscore the problem, in February, 2016, a software malfunction at the G.P.S. Master Control Station, in Colorado, caused a thirteen-microsecond clock error in some of the satellites. The glitch took hours to fix, during which the infected satellites spread the timing pathogen across the world. The worst catastrophes were avoided (“World dodges G.P.S. bullet,” proclaimed the trade journal GPS World), but computer networks crashed and digital broadcasts (including the BBC’s) were disrupted. Systems engineers couldn’t help but imagine—and fear—that the nightmare they’d barely avoided could soon become real.
The final experiment Humphreys conducted with his spoofer was something of a lark: the owner of a sixty-five-metre super-yacht invited him to try to commandeer its journey across the Mediterranean, from Monaco to Greece. Standing on the upper deck, Humphreys’s team aimed the spoofer at the ship’s antennas, leading the vessel hundreds of metres off course. The experiment was harmless but proved to be a harbinger of some of the most mysterious uses of spoofing.
Four years later, in June, 2017, a French oil tanker, the Atria, sailed across the Mediterranean, through the Bosporus strait, and into the Black Sea. As the ship approached the Russian city of Novorossiysk, the captain, Gurvan Le Meur, noticed that the ship’s navigation system appeared to have lost its G.P.S. signal. The signal soon returned, but the position it gave was way off. The Atria was apparently some forty kilometres inland, shipwrecked at the airport in Gelendzhik, a Russian resort town.
Le Meur radioed nearby vessels, whose captains reported similar malfunctions in their navigation systems: all in all, twenty other ships had been “transported” to the same inland airport. Meanwhile, something similar had been happening in Moscow—this time to Uber customers, not ship captains. Passengers taking short trips discovered that their accounts were charged for drives all the way to one of the city’s airports, or even to locales thousands of miles away.
The activity attracted the interest of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a Washington-based think tank focussed on security issues. Using data from ships, which are required by maritime treaties to continuously broadcast their location, researchers discovered that the spoofing problem was much larger than anyone had realized. According to a report released in March of 2019, there were ten thousand spoofing incidents at sea between February 2016 and November 2018, affecting about a thousand and three hundred vessels. Similar data are harder to come by for land vehicles, but C4ADS used heat maps from fitness-tracking smartphone apps to confirm that drivers near the Kremlin and in St. Petersburg encountered similar spoofing.
Once they had logged where and when the spoofing incidents occurred, researchers cross-referenced this information with the travel schedule of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. On a fall afternoon in 2017, six minutes before Putin gave a speech in the coastal town of Bolshoy Kamen, a nearby ship’s G.P.S. coordinates showed it jumping to the airport in Vladivostok. In 2018, when Putin attended the official opening of a bridge across the Kerch Strait, at least twenty-four ships in the area reported their location as Anapa Airport, sixty-five kilometres away. What was going on? It seemed increasingly likely that the President’s security detail was travelling with a portable software-defined spoofer, in the hope of protecting Putin from drone attacks.


The strange specificity of the spoofing—the relocation of ships and vehicles to airports—has a cagey explanation. Most drones contain geofencing firmware, which prevents them from entering designated areas, including the world’s major airports. If a drone senses that it’s near an airport, either because it actually is or because spoofed G.P.S. coordinates make it believe that it is, it will either return to its starting point or simply down itself.
For one of the world’s most prominent politicians, spoofing may not seem like an unreasonable precaution. In August, 2018, a speech by the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, was interrupted when a pair of drones detonated above one of Caracas’s largest thoroughfares. A few days later, French secret-service agents destroyed a mysterious drone that flew too close to the summer home of the French President, Emmanuel Macron. But for those who’ve fallen prey to spoofing incidents—the befuddled captains at sea, the overcharged passengers in Moscow—it may be difficult to accept that they are merely collateral in attempts to shield a head of state. And the same technology that might seem like a strategic security system in some circumstances contains within it an ominous potential for subterfuge.
Humphreys served as a contributor and adviser for the C4ADS study, and he had a feeling the Black Sea spoofing was even more extensive than the report revealed. To test his hunch, he sought out data from the International Space Station, which collects G.P.S. signals in the upper atmosphere; as it orbited Earth, it would give Humphreys a direct line of sight to the Black Sea. He obtained data from three different orbits in 2018, which he sat down to study that winter, while on sabbatical in his wife’s home town, in the Canary Islands.
Unlike the noisy surface of the planet, which is dense with radio signals, the upper atmosphere is a quiet zone, where trespassing frequencies stand out; Humphreys could instantly detect the interference in the Black Sea data. Where were the phantom signals coming from? Humphreys knew that, as the space station passed overhead, the spoofed signal created a kind of Doppler effect. It was a simple clue, familiar to most urban dwellers: Imagine driving a car toward a crime scene that you can hear—sirens, megaphones—but not see. You’ll know when you’re getting close, because of the sudden increase in the pitch of these ambient noises. In much the same way, Humphreys could use the changes in the spoofer’s signal to begin to surmise where it was coming from. When he crunched the numbers, he came up with two possible locations: a forest in Romania and somewhere in Syria. He recalculated using data from another space-station recording and this time concluded that the signal was originating from either the German countryside or, again, somewhere in Syria. When Humphreys checked the exact locations, the two sets of Syrian coordinates were identical: the Khmeimim Airbase, a site on the coast associated with Russian military activity in the country. Further calculations narrowed the source of the interference to a transmitter in the base’s northwest quadrant.
The phantom signals Humphreys spotted were unlike anything he’d ever seen before, combining elements of both jamming and spoofing. Like jamming, these signals didn’t transmit actual coordinates. But they were more than just noise—like spoofing, they convinced receivers to recognize false G.P.S. signals. Humphreys calls this “smart jamming” and considers it a new front in the G.P.S.-signal wars. If an authentic signal is a light bulb thousands of miles away, the Syrian fake is a high-wattage spotlight filling your field of vision, blinding you to everything.
A commercial jetliner flying thirty thousand feet above a smart jammer would encounter a signal ten billion times more powerful than an ordinary, authentic G.P.S. signal. Even for an airplane just coming over the horizon, with the farthest line-of-sight path to the transmitter, the smart-jammer signal would be five hundred times more powerful than the real one.
What Humphreys discovered coming from Khmeimim is the most aggressive G.P.S. disruption device to date. “It’s the most potent example of jamming I’ve ever seen,” Humphreys said. “I call it my Jack Ryan moment.” In January, 2018, the airbase was attacked by a swarm of thirteen drones carrying explosives. Somehow, the attack was thwarted; Humphreys posits that a smart jammer repelled the attack with the assistance of anti-aircraft munitions.
G.P.S. interference will likely be a way for America’s foes to fight in conflicts that they could not win conventionally. The civilian uses of G.P.S. have long outnumbered the military applications, but G.P.S. is still part of just about every American weapons system. “This is us getting our first taste of what it’s like to go up against a serious adversary in electronic warfare,” Humphreys said. “I don’t think Russia has shown all its cards yet.”
In July of last year, the captain of a container ship registered in the U.S. noticed something strange with his navigation system as he entered the port of Shanghai. The ship’s G.P.S. placed the vessel several kilometres inland. When Humphreys and C4ADS heard of the incident, they doubted that it was an isolated event. “We looked at more data, and, by golly, we saw the same thing popping up in areas around China’s coastline,” Humphreys said. Three hundred other ships had been subject to spoofing in Shanghai on the same day, and thousands of others in the same year. What was unusual about the Shanghai spoofing was that the vessels, rather than being “transported” to the same fake location, were all reporting different coordinates. Further analysis by Bjorn Bergman, at the watchdog group SkyTruth, showed a similar pattern in twenty other locations in China.
Humphreys admits that he isn’t sure what explains this new approach to spoofing—or who is behind it. Some have hypothesized that petroleum smugglers and sand thieves may be using the technology to sneak into ports more or less invisibly. Bergman has suggested that the Chinese government is involved in the spoofing; Humphreys says the pattern is widespread enough that it is certainly aware of the activity. Whoever is responsible hasn’t been especially careful—and may not care about being found out. “It really seems like they sent in the junior-varsity team for this one,” Humphreys said.
But is there any incentive to work harder? The kind of software-defined spoofer Humphreys revealed at White Sands is now much easier to obtain; you don’t have to be a mastermind to pull off a spoofing attack. And the ease with which amateurs can cause major disruptions should make us worry about what the experts are capable of. Humphreys predicts that the next significant spoofing attacks will target G.P.S.-enabled clocks—and could come from state or non-state actors.
“We’re seeing a general consensus that G.P.S. is wonderful, but we’ve got to cut our habit,” Humphreys told me. The signature precision of the system seems to be giving way to blurry, unnerving chaos. But what might a viable alternative look like? Over all, G.P.S. remains a remarkably robust system. Its major vulnerability is the weakness of the signal itself. One fix would be to rebuild the system with a stronger signal by using satellites much closer to us. But this change would require many more satellites to provide global coverage: seven hundred, compared with the current baseline of twenty-four. “Government control of G.P.S. has been a real benefit to all of humanity, the fact that it rains down free from above, with no contract or subscription fees, but I don’t think the G.P.S. program has the funds to expand to low-Earth orbit,” Humphreys said.
We may be witnessing the first stage of the death of G.P.S. as we know it. For several years, G.P.S. was the world’s only complete global navigation satellite system. Its only real competition was Russia’s GLONASS, which ranked a distant second. Today, China has implemented the Beidou satellite system, and the European Union has been developing another, called Galileo. But these systems work on similar principles to G.P.S. and have the same vulnerabilities.
The answer could eventually be some kind of public-private partnership. Humphreys predicts that companies maintaining hundreds of low-Earth-orbit networks—such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Amazon’s Project Kuiper—will eventually become a key component of the G.P.S. ecosystem, picking up the slack in the event of malfunctions or attacks. The new system will be just like G.P.S. as we know it—with one major exception. “It’ll be a pay service, no question,” Humphreys said. “But maybe that’s a decent insurance policy.”
__________________
Advertisement

__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 09:03 PM   #2
Guru
 
psneeld's Avatar
 
City: AICW
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Freedom
Vessel Model: Albin 40
Join Date: Oct 2011
Posts: 21,797
You kn oh w of course paper charts and charts downloaded to a computer are the same and have nothing to do with GPS?

And you can more easily and accurately use electronic chart plotting tools than a po pencil, dividers and whatever.....again all without GPS.
__________________

psneeld is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 09:11 PM   #3
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
Quote:
Originally Posted by psneeld View Post
You kn oh w of course paper charts and charts downloaded to a computer are the same and have nothing to do with GPS?

And you can more easily and accurately use electronic chart plotting tools than a po pencil, dividers and whatever.....again all without GPS.
It's not quite clear what you're trying to say. Your text is kind of messed up.

I use GPS and a chart plotter. Love it, use it all the time. Make use of tablets and phones too.

But, with paper charts and plotting tools, compass, hand held bearing compass and radar I'll get around without concern if GPS goes down. Been doing that since long before the GPS constellation went up.
__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 09:20 PM   #4
Guru
 
psneeld's Avatar
 
City: AICW
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Freedom
Vessel Model: Albin 40
Join Date: Oct 2011
Posts: 21,797
You can do the exact same thing on a computer or tablet as on paper....and it does not have to have GPS hooked to it.

Mouse instead of pencil, computer calculates distance and plots degrees for you....it cant tell you where you are but neither can a paper chart.

Position info has to come from somewhere if no GPS...but LOPs or bearings, radar or geographical, etc...etc to determine position...thenj plot those same things on paper or the computer to fix your position.

All without the aid of GPS.
psneeld is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 10:05 PM   #5
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
Now I understand your point. Yes, agree, it's possible to do traditional piloting on a plotter. However my preference when using traditional methods and tools is to do it on paper charts. Maybe it's because I "grew up" plotting on paper but I like using the tools.
__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 10:34 PM   #6
Guru
 
MurrayM's Avatar
 
City: Kitimat, North Coast BC
Country: Canada
Vessel Name: Badger
Vessel Model: 30' Sundowner Tug
Join Date: Jul 2012
Posts: 6,412
Someone spills their beverage on the computer or it self destructs in some other way?

We have a bunch of charts for BC's coast from our paddling days, and a neighbour got out of commercial fishing so we have more charts than we'll probably ever need.

Oh, I know, people probably have several electronic options, but not having paper charts seems like making a rock climbing belay station on one piece of gear.
__________________
"The most interesting path between two points is not a straight line" Murray Minchin
MurrayM is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 10:50 PM   #7
Enigma
 
RT Firefly's Avatar
 
City: Slicker?
Country: Bumpkin?
Join Date: Oct 2007
Posts: 14,425
Greetings,
I think if some sort of offensive scenario as noted in the OP occurs, having paper charts will be the least of one's worries.
__________________
RTF
RT Firefly is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-13-2020, 11:19 PM   #8
Guru
 
City: Qualicum Beach, Vancouver Island
Country: Canada
Vessel Name: Capricorn
Vessel Model: Mariner 28 - Sedan Cruiser 1969
Join Date: Feb 2019
Posts: 1,300
Smart phones, et. al. use "assisted gps" with cell towers as the reference. Where I boat, some but not all areas are covered by cell phone towers. In fact I used this very technology the second time out on my - new to me - current boat on its second trip. I hadn't brushed up on the Lowrance chart plotter so I was having some troubles with it. The unit worked fine it was just me not knowing what to do with it, no instruction book had come with it and I hadn't downloaded one at that time.

I left under clear blue skies and not a cloud in sight, only to run into forest fire smoke as thick as a fog. I had my chart out on the dinette table but I had no reference to pin point where I was. So I turned on my phone and used Google Maps to locate me on my chart. For you locals, this was in Baynes Sound between Denman Island and Vancouver Island.

The next time I went out I had Navionics on my tablet and the manual downloaded for the Lowrance.
rsn48 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 05:19 AM   #9
Guru
 
O C Diver's Avatar
 
City: Fort Myers, FL... Summers in Crisfield, MD
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Slow Hand
Vessel Model: Cherubini Independence 45
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 9,304
Quote:
Originally Posted by RT Firefly View Post
Greetings,
I think if some sort of offensive scenario as noted in the OP occurs, having paper charts will be the least of one's worries.


This is kind of like asking how you will access Trawler Forum after the nuclear pulse takes out your smartphone.

Ted
__________________
Blog: mvslowhand.com
I'm tired of fast moves, I've got a slow groove, on my mind.....
I want to spend some time, Not come and go in a heated rush.....
"Slow Hand" by The Pointer Sisters
O C Diver is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 05:47 AM   #10
FF
Guru
 
FF's Avatar
 
Join Date: Oct 2007
Posts: 20,874
IF someone pops off a small nuke in orbit, GPS and most navigation might be gone for a long time.

Keeping on board a recording depth sounder, (contour nav) an AM radio (LOP) a sextant for measuring angles to landmarks , and all the old stuff might prove handy.

Of course your dirt house may be with out water ,sewer or electric for a longer time, perhaps years.
FF is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 07:38 AM   #11
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
My take away from the article is GPS is not a secure system and is subject to spoofing and jamming.



Quote:
Originally Posted by RT Firefly View Post
Greetings,
I think if some sort of offensive scenario as noted in the OP occurs, having paper charts will be the least of one's worries.
Quote:
Originally Posted by O C Diver View Post


This is kind of like asking how you will access Trawler Forum after the nuclear pulse takes out your smartphone.

Ted
Quote:
Originally Posted by FF View Post
IF someone pops off a small nuke in orbit, GPS and most navigation might be gone for a long time.

Keeping on board a recording depth sounder, (contour nav) an AM radio (LOP) a sextant for measuring angles to landmarks , and all the old stuff might prove handy.

Of course your dirt house may be with out water ,sewer or electric for a longer time, perhaps years.
__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 09:03 AM   #12
Guru
 
caltexflanc's Avatar
 
City: North Carolina for now
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Small Incentive
Vessel Model: Boston Whaler 130 Sport
Join Date: Aug 2011
Posts: 6,234
I've witnesses some of this phenomena first hand:


I use paper charts, binoculars with bearing compass,depth finder and radar to help me know where I am, and not to plot routes.

A lot of advanced chart plotters these days (obviously, I think, not our old Furuno) use some mixture of the the various GPS systems, GNSS and Galileo in particular.
__________________
George

"There's the Right Way, the Wrong Way, and what some guy says he's gotten away with"
caltexflanc is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 09:31 AM   #13
Guru
 
O C Diver's Avatar
 
City: Fort Myers, FL... Summers in Crisfield, MD
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Slow Hand
Vessel Model: Cherubini Independence 45
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 9,304
Quote:
Originally Posted by Portage_Bay View Post
My take away from the article is GPS is not a secure system and is subject to spoofing and jamming.
So, are you worried about someone spoofing the GPS on your boat?

Ted
__________________
Blog: mvslowhand.com
I'm tired of fast moves, I've got a slow groove, on my mind.....
I want to spend some time, Not come and go in a heated rush.....
"Slow Hand" by The Pointer Sisters
O C Diver is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 09:32 AM   #14
Member
 
City: NJ
Country: USA
Join Date: Oct 2017
Posts: 24
The prudent mariner always has 3 ways of determining his position.
alormaria2 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 10:16 AM   #15
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
Quote:
Originally Posted by O C Diver View Post
So, are you worried about someone spoofing the GPS on your boat?

Ted

I'm not worried about anyone targeting me. When I read the article I took note of captains of large commercial ships experiencing spoofing that put their indicated position miles away from their actual position. The spoofing was not aimed at their ship but rather a blanket broadcast for other reasons.

Further when I pay attention to what the author is saying that spoofing hardware and software is now in the hands of the less technically able including amateurs it makes me consider the security of the GPS system and how we all, myself included, have come to put full trust in the system. When it is in fact not secure.

The source of the spoofing could be anyone from a hostile state, to internal security trying to protect a sensitive target such as the president, to some dumb ass kid playing with it to see if they can get away with. Similar to how they will hack sensitive computer systems for the "sport" of it.
__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 10:18 AM   #16
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
When you observed this were you underway or anchored for many hours? I've seen some odd wobbles in the track when anchored.



Quote:
Originally Posted by caltexflanc View Post
I've witnesses some of this phenomena first hand:


I use paper charts, binoculars with bearing compass,depth finder and radar to help me know where I am, and not to plot routes.

A lot of advanced chart plotters these days (obviously, I think, not our old Furuno) use some mixture of the the various GPS systems, GNSS and Galileo in particular.
__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 11:22 AM   #17
Senior Member
 
Leatherneck's Avatar
 
City: Tall Timbers MD
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Devil Dog
Vessel Model: 1987 Jefferson 42 Sundeck
Join Date: Sep 2019
Posts: 136
Several months after 9/11 I noticed that whenever driving by the Pentagon my car GPS would suddenly show my car displaced from the roadway by several hundred meters. Didn't take them long to incorporate that protection.
__________________
---------------
George
Leatherneck is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 11:40 AM   #18
Guru
 
Northern Spy's Avatar
 
City: Powell River, BC
Country: Canada
Vessel Name: Northern Spy
Vessel Model: Nordic Tug 26
Join Date: Feb 2012
Posts: 3,559
This article seems almost like a planned release of information by the military.

I recall when it was revealed that NR-1 had tracks in National Geographic. Information that was classified up until that article. That was a message.
Northern Spy is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 12:09 PM   #19
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
Prior to 9/11and post 9/11 I've experienced electronic instability when passing the Trident sub base on Hood Canal. Not every time but often enough to suspect something.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Leatherneck View Post
Several months after 9/11 I noticed that whenever driving by the Pentagon my car GPS would suddenly show my car displaced from the roadway by several hundred meters. Didn't take them long to incorporate that protection.
__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2020, 12:12 PM   #20
Guru
 
Portage_Bay's Avatar
 
City: Coupeville Wa.
Country: United States
Vessel Name: Pelorus
Vessel Model: Californian 42 LRC
Join Date: Oct 2015
Posts: 912
You've got my curiosity. What is NR-1 and what tracks revealed in Natl Geo?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Northern Spy View Post
This article seems almost like a planned release of information by the military.

I recall when it was revealed that NR-1 had tracks in National Geographic. Information that was classified up until that article. That was a message.
__________________

__________________
CRS. Can't remember sh!t. My dad uses to say that. As I stare 70 in the face... Oh, what were we talking about?
Portage_Bay is online now   Reply With Quote
Reply

Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Trackbacks are Off
Pingbacks are Off
Refbacks are Off





All times are GMT -5. The time now is 08:58 AM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.8 Beta 4
Copyright ©2000 - 2020, vBulletin Solutions, Inc.
Search Engine Optimization by vBSEO 3.6.0
Copyright 2006 - 2012
×