El Faro Sinking

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Further to that point, it's the debris field that first needs to be located. Then the tedious process of working through and cataloging the components of the debris field can begin. Hopefully, the VDR is in that (or those) fields.

I'm certain that ROV and subsea search technology has vastly improved in the couple of decades since I was last involved. At that time, subsea searches resembled looking at the ocean bed through a yard long soda straw even with the advent of sidescan sonar.

In any case, I expect it will be a long haul.
 
My understanding is the VDR, if intact, should be broadcasting a locating ping for 30 days after it has been activated by water. The local news here in JAX is focusing on that. Hopefully it is working and detectable in that deep of water.
 
My understanding is the VDR, if intact, should be broadcasting a locating ping for 30 days after it has been activated by water. The local news here in JAX is focusing on that. Hopefully it is working and detectable in that deep of water.


I've also read there are models that can float free of the ship. And that there are models that have two parts. One that floats free and one part that stays affixed to the ship after a sinking.

I also thought I read something about there having to be painted by a signal to activate there pinger.
 
also thought I read something about there having to be painted by a signal to activate there pinger.

if they are similar to the voice and data recorders used on aircraft they simply start transmitting and do so until the batteries die.

The ones used in the marine industry may be different, however.
 
if they are similar to the voice and data recorders used on aircraft they simply start transmitting and do so until the batteries die.
What triggers the "start?"
Do you know the failure to start or misfire ratio?
 
A ship that does not operate between US ports ... US to anywhere but the US and vice versa is outside of the Jones Act requirements.
 
OK, I understand what you are saying about the Jones Act. Perhaps it's splitting hairs, but there is a difference between being in compliance with a law and being subject to a law. I think every boat is US waters is subject to the Jones Act, but it's also true that the freighters you mention are in compliance because they have not called on two successive US ports.
 
What triggers the "start?"

Water immersion. Here's a picture and description of one. There are probably several manufacturers of the beacons.
 

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If the black box isn't found on the surface, I have to wonder if the bazzillions of taxpayer dollars that would be spent to find it with an ROV would be worth it. The general causal factors surrounding the incident are fairly obvious. If it's about settling law suits, then let the litigants foot that bill. Given the circumstances, I doubt that safety regulations would change as a result of findings.
 
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It's in 15,000 feet of water, the beacon has feet located as its pinging, now we need a volunteer to swim down and get it.
 
If the black box isn't found on the surface, I have to wonder if the bazzillions of taxpayer dollars that would be spent to find it with an ROV would be worth it. The general causal factors surrounding the incident are fairly obvious. If it's about settling law suits, then let the litigants foot that bill. Given the circumstances, I doubt that safety regulations would change as a result of findings.

Actually the causal factors are not at all obvious. We know engines failed, but have no idea why. We know 5 Polish mechanics were on board, but not what they were doing. We know it was in a hurricane path but not why. We know nothing about the condition of the boat. Three former crewmen have reported many issues in that regard. We don't know about the communication between the captain and the company. We don't know how well the cargo was loaded and secured. We don't know about the crew and their training. We don't know the weight of the cargo or the center of balance. Much loading is done based on standard container weights. Was there anything unique about the containers on this ship? There are probably many factors involved.

The investigation is like that of any other boat or vehicle or plane in the US. They are not done for litigants, they are done to save lives. Look at the charter bus companies that have been put out of business and others with additional requirements. Did the ship owner push, encourage, or fail to stop the ship from a dangerous undertaking. What pressure was there? What were the known issues with this boat and it's boiler system? If this was an airplane crashed, wouldn't we also want to make an attempt to retrieve the black box? Should this boat have been removed from service previously? The last inspection was early this year, was it done satisfactorily or what might have happened since then? Will the CG learn something that improves their inspections and oversight and prevents this from recurring?

There is nothing simple about this.

in January 2011, the sister ship, the El Yunque, lost water to its boiler, triggering a shutdown of the boiler fires, causing the ship to lose propulsion for three hours. Should this have been a warning, especially with people on board to work on a boiler? I read a statement that indicated the captain had a plan to clear in advance of the hurricane if everything went right. Do we predicate our plans on everything going right? Maybe there's a lot for other skilled, respected captains to still learn from this. Maybe a bit more attention to be paid to Murphy's law, especially when dealing with hurricanes. In April 2011, the El Faro temporarily lost power when the generator breaker tripped and main propulsion was lost. Engineers later found that it was caused by a severed wire. Things do happen, especially to old boats about to make their final run before refit and being sent to another area for smaller runs.

I'm sure the sister ship will be looked at closely for any clues and also before allowing it on the water again.

One crewman who ended his time in January said "The El Faro was on its ... needed a death certificate. It was a rust bucket," Cash said. "You don't take a ship like that ... that ship wasn't supposed to be on the water." Well, the USCG did inspect it after January. Obviously they didn't agree.

Investigation is primarily to learn. Secondarily it may assess blame as part of that. Was there any irresponsibility on the part of the ship owner? If so, that merits harsh actions.

By doing such investigations on planes we've found major issues in the past that have led to the grounding of many other planes until changes were made. Now, there aren't many other ships like this one, but it could still lead to some changes.

As to litigation this information isn't really likely to change it that much. The ship owner is liable regardless and his insurance will be expected to pay.

As to agencies lawyering up, there's no lawyering of agencies. Only lawyers are the ship owner and his insurer's defending against the crew families.

The NTSB, which will make records -- including documents, diagrams, interview transcripts and data -- public throughout the investigation through its open docket, is expected to release a final report on its findings within 12-18 months. I've read many of their reports and they seem to me to do an excellent job. I believe wholeheartedly that their overall work saves lives. It saves lives on the roads, in the air and on the water. They are already well into the investigation, having been conducting many interviews and collecting a lot of information and data.
 
Accident investigators-- and I know and sometimes work with some of them-- tend to not put a lot of stock in statements from "former crewmembers" and the like. The reason is the 15-minutes-of-fame rule. With the ship (or plane) gone and most or all the people on board gone, too, it's human nature to play up speculation or dramatize one's opinion of the condition of the vessel or the capabilities of the crew as there's nobody to refute it. A minor fault gets turned into a major "accident waiting to happen" in many of these kinds of statements. An officer once seen to be having a drink becomes an "alchohol aabuser" and so on.

A fellow I worked closely with on a project over the course of a couple of years was one of our company's investigators on the crash of the Asiana 777 at SFO. He explained to me the string of errors that began even before their descent began that made the crash inevitable.

But the interesting thing to me was his description of the need to maintain objectivity throughout the investigation and not be swayed by witness, co-worker, etc. statements that "offered" any sort of explanation, regardless of their plausibility, unless or until they could be confirmed beyond a doubt. These statements are not ignored, but they are given no credibility until they "earn" it.

I suspect the statements and claims of former crewmembers of the El Faro are being treated the same way.
 
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Accident investigators-- and I know and sometimes work with some of them-- tend to not put a lot of stock in statements from "former crewmembers" and the like. The reason is the 15-minutes-of-fame rule. With the ship (or plane) gone and most or all the people on board gone, too, it's human nature to play up speculation or dramatize one's opinion of the condition of the vessel or the capabilities of the crew as there's nobody to refute it. A minor fault gets turned into a major "accident waiting to happen" in many of these kinds of statements. An officer once seen to be having a drink becomes an "alchohol aabuser" and so on.

A fellow I worked closely with on a project over the course of a couple of years was one of our company's investigators on the crash of the Asiana 777 at SFO. He explained to me the string of errors that began even before their descent began resulted in the crash.

But the interesting thing to me was his description of the need to maintain objectivity throughout the investigation and not be swayed by witness, co-worker, etc. statements that "offered" any sort of explanation, regardless of their plausibility, unless or until they could be confirmed beyond a doubt. These statements are not ignored, but they are given no credibility until they "earn" it.

I suspect the statements and claims of former crewmembers of the El Faro are being treated the same way.

That's the way it is with all statements and information gathered. I think they do a great job of it.

Here is the link to their site for anyone wanting to follow the actual investigation.

DCA16MM001
 
What triggers the "start?"
Do you know the failure to start or misfire ratio?

The aircraft voice and data recorders themselves have no location capabilities. They are encased in boxes with very high resistance to heat and shock. An underwater locator with specific characteristics is mounted to the outside of the box and is triggered by immersion in water.

They are mouted in the rear of the fuselage as that is generally the portion of an airplane that suffers the least damage. I have no idea where they are mounted on a ship.
 
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With all the lawyers involved everyone will be pointing fingers at everyone else so whatever "facts" that get out will be biased at best. Even when the NTSB has their hearing I expect that politics will be involved. Take it from me, one who was personally involved in an accident investigated by the NTSB. Everyone likes to jump to conclusions so go ahead and that will be your reality.
 
Well, the USCG did inspect it after January. Obviously they didn't agree.

Excellent post BandB.:thumb:
There is one thing though. As to the CG inspection, I'm not sure how much weight that will carry, or how much weight I would give it as an accident investigator.

it really depends on the type of inspection.

I can't count the number of vessels I've been on doing USCG inspections.
We went through the motions, checked the boxes, reviewed the crew compliment, checked nav, comms, et al, blah, blah, blah...then left.
Some of the vessels I'd never want to get U/W on regardless of the fact that they "passed" the inspection.

If the black box isn't found on the surface, I have to wonder if the bazzillions of taxpayer dollars that would be spent to find it with an ROV would be worth it. The general causal factors surrounding the incident are fairly obvious. If it's about settling law suits, then let the litigants foot that bill. Given the circumstances, I doubt that safety regulations would change as a result of findings.

This has been addressed, so I won't be redundant; however, if the findings reveal safety issues with the vessel, personnel training, procedures, etc., then yes, standards and regulations may in fact change as a result.

VDR or not, every Gov. agency that has ever picked up a pair of binoculars will be lawyered up on the taxpayer's dime.

The government won't have an issue unless the attorney's can find fault with let's say the CG's inspection, for example. Even then, suing the Feds is a royal PITA. Don't think the Gov't has a worry in this one. The shipping company on the other hand....:eek:

In one of the videos on the NTSB site, linked by BandB, it was stated the VDR was located "on the bridge" and did not elaborate.

Marin, Capt. Bill posted a pic of one mounted on a vessel a page or two back, and I threw in a Wikipedia link for additional info if you're interested. The 2 posts are almost on top of one another a page or two back.

OD
 
OK, I understand what you are saying about the Jones Act. Perhaps it's splitting hairs, but there is a difference between being in compliance with a law and being subject to a law. I think every boat is US waters is subject to the Jones Act, but it's also true that the freighters you mention are in compliance because they have not called on two successive US ports.

Incorrect. No foreign flagged ships fall under the Jones Act, but they fall under our federal regulations when in US waters. A non US built, American flagged ship doesn't fall under the Jones Act neither, but they also fall under our federal regulations. A ship calling on successive US ports doesn't really have anything to do with the Jones Act, the cargo does. A non-Jones Act ship, foreign or US flagged, can not load cargo in 1 US port and discharge in another US port. What they do is load cargo in the US and discharge over seas, load up over seas and discharge in the US.


As far as the El Faro inspection, I bet it was the annual COI. If vessels are not seaworthy, and the USCG passes them, that's on the CG and they should be heald responsible.
 
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Spent decades with FAA Aircraft Certification, who along with the manufacturer are typically the technical brains behind the NTSB person out front. I understand the system and the safety objective. I'm all for safety and lessons learned. But I also understand that safety has a price....a very big one. And I'm contending that a serious cost-benefits analysis should be applied in circumstances such as this one. It's not like this was an airliner or one of a large fleet of the same design. It's a virtual one-off. The leadership in this investigation should be stepping back and looking at what they already know, and then compare it to the safety payoff for the public at large....it's their money. I can see this turning into a circus with the government techies in charge turning it into their life's work...it's happened before.
 
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The El Faro was CG inspected her class. All of the ships, U.S flagged or foreign flagged that call on U.S. ports today are also operated and maintained to ISM standards. This has done a huge service to rid the worlds oceans of rust bucket "Tramp" steamers that use to ply the waters. The ISM standards are a worldwide operating requirement for crew training, safety equipment and company operations procedures to protect the safety of people and the environment. Most countries are signatory to it and require its use.

The VDR is probably not the float free variety. That is an option not required and very expensive , apparently.

The cargo did shift on this ship, it was reported to the CG as having a 15 degree list. She also reported taking on water but it was controlled at the last report with the CG.

There was also a very brief signal from the Epirb as reported by CG authorities.

Interview with John Nicoll was spot on, much speculation by all of us without knowing the facts between the Captain and the company. I've known John for 30 years and he is a professional mariner of the highest order. He was on that Jax to PR run for years and recently retired as the master of the Horizon Trader.
 
Spent decades with FAA Aircraft Certification, who along with the manufacturer are typically the technical brains behind the NTSB person out front. I understand the system and the safety objective. I'm all for safety and lessons learned. But I also understand that safety has a price....a very big one. And I'm contending that a serious cost-benefits analysis should be applied in circumstances such as this one. It's not like this was an airliner or one of a large fleet of the same design. It's a virtual one-off. The leadership in this investigation should be stepping back and looking at what they already know, and then compare it to the safety payoff for the public at large....it's their money. I can see this turning into a circus with the government techies in charge turning it into their life's work...it's happened before.

It will definitely take a while and be expensive. While there isn't but one other identical boat, there's an entire industry of ships and ship owners and ship captains. When you stop investigating accidents like this you open the door for abuse, for chance taking, for continuing to use derelict ships, for overloading or for anything else found in this investigation. I think when 33 lives are lost, all in retrospect avoidable although that doesn't mean anyone did anything wrong, then I think there is a need to know what happened and try to prevent a repeat. Will the information be useful for future safety? We have no idea because we don't know what they'll find out. It may be nothing we don't already know but it could be quite revealing.

All aspects of safety cost and that includes investigating accidents. Having safer cars cost tremendously. The thing about safety is that it is very seldom voluntary. Unfortunately it takes investigation and regulation.
 
Incorrect. No foreign flagged ships fall under the Jones Act, but they fall under our federal regulations when in US waters.
A non US built, American flagged ship doesn't fall under the Jones Act neither, but they also fall under our federal regulations. A ship calling on successive US ports doesn't really have anything to do with the Jones Act, the cargo does. A non-Jones Act ship, foreign or US flagged, can not load cargo in 1 US port and discharge in another US port. What they do is load cargo in the US and discharge over seas, load up over seas and discharge in the US.

I think you need to read the Jones Act which is a federal law. So any person and any ship within US jurisdiction is subject to it. And there is no such thing as a "Jones Act Ship". The Jones act prohibits certain shipping activities, and allows others. Certain activities are only allowed using US Documented Vessels which are also US owned and US built. And it absolutely involves both the ship and cargo, as both are subject to seizure when there is a violation.

When you refer to a "Jones Act Ship", I think you are referring to a ship that meets the criteria for shipping between US ports. But this may all just be a matter of terminology.
 
It will definitely take a while and be expensive. While there isn't but one other identical boat, there's an entire industry of ships and ship owners and ship captains. When you stop investigating accidents like this you open the door for abuse, for chance taking, for continuing to use derelict ships, for overloading or for anything else found in this investigation. I think when 33 lives are lost, all in retrospect avoidable although that doesn't mean anyone did anything wrong, then I think there is a need to know what happened and try to prevent a repeat. Will the information be useful for future safety? We have no idea because we don't know what they'll find out. It may be nothing we don't already know but it could be quite revealing.

All aspects of safety cost and that includes investigating accidents. Having safer cars cost tremendously. The thing about safety is that it is very seldom voluntary. Unfortunately it takes investigation and regulation.

Didn't say "stop investigating". I said given the obvious circumstances, be very careful about spending scads of taxpayer funds trolling around on the bottom to extract and analyze every shred of data.
 
I copied and pasted this strongly worded letter from a Ship mate of the lost sailors.


"As an American Merchant Marine Officer, I am disgusted with the lack of resources, lack of response and acknowledgment of government officials and general publics response to this tragic accident.

To the men and women searching for the crew. I thank you and appreciate your efforts. I realize you don't call the shots and would search the rest of your life if you could.

A plane crashes with 1 American onboard months of searching and millions spent. The public watches news for hours and hours for weeks and weeks

A black man is shot while breaking the law; public rioting, nationwide protesting, dumb ass president addresses the country, orders investigation by DOJ, and starts multi million dollar program to prevent it from happening again.

A nearly 800 ft American flagged cargo ship disappears with 28 Americans onboard, 6 ****ing days is all they get and not a ****ing word from any dickhead in government.

To the public who don't know what Merchant Mariners are, we are the people who inhabit the 70% of the world most people can't (the sea). We deliver your food, expensive purses, fancy shoes, nice cars, and the gas that makes them go vroom on big ass ships in all types of conditions.

To the clueless Facebook world. I have not seen one post from anyone who is not or does not know a merchant mariner about these tragic events. But I do see posts and likes about how people consider dogs and cats their children and stupid engagement pictures everywhere thinking that it means something. Next time you put your clothes on, eat, drive your car, and post stupid **** using your iPhone realize these things are only possible because of men and women like the crew of the El Faro.

To the Monday morning quarterbacks of the maritime industry and news. Shut the hole in your face and lose the ego. You obviously have never gone to sea and if you have you've **** your pants in bad weather like everyone else has we're just man enough to admit.

In Peace and War"
 
The lack of survivors in survival suits, the lack of comms, implies that things went bad fast. Just one message off about the loss of the steam plant, flooding, list. Then nothing.

So far things indicate a capsize.

Here's an interesting read from 1945 regarding a loss of warships in a Pacific typhoon. Some parallels to this incident. I also like Adm Nimitz's writing style. First rate guy on many levels.

Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter on Lessons of Damage in Typhoon

Yep.
Para 9 & 10 sum it up pretty well.
 

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