Boeing 737 MAX

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Problems like the Max-8 are the result of over reliance on twenty-something tech whiz kids, who believe everything from cancer to airplanes can be made better with computers. Every time I get an "upgrade" to anything tech it turns out to be more cumbersome than the one it replaced. Memory is dirt cheap so they can write all the BS they want into everything they produce. Tech companies have these people on the payroll, many are immigrants who work cheap compared to was a US resident needs to live on. So what the hell, let them write what they want. Never mind that they possess little or no knowledge or experience about what they are writing software for. Its technology for technologies sake, needed or not, useful or not, hey through it in, let's show the world how clever we are. Too clever by half, I say.

Now I get automated email notices from my bank that saying "We noticed that your electric bill was $2 more that last month. Is there a problem?" Yes, you dumb asses, its winter, its colder and days are shorter, so more electricity is needed for light an heat. Got it? Technology run amok and common sense down the crapper.
 
I'm curious about how this is being absorbed by the overall airline industry.


- What are carriers doing now that they are "missing" some number of planes? Do they just cut back routes and flights and fly what they have with new schedules? Do they lease planes from others, perhaps bringing retired planes back in service?


- Where are all the MAX planes sitting? Is there that much free storage space at airports? Have they all been flown back to Boeing? Or are they in the desert airplane graveyard, waiting at the door?


- Who is absorbing the cost of these grounded planes? There are lease payments that I'm sure are still due, yet no revenue from the planes. That's a huge cash burn for the airlines. Do you suppose they have business interruption insurance?


- How many of the airlines have sued Boeing for loss of business? I expect every one of them, unless there was some prohibition on that in the plane purchase agreement.


- Does Boeing built to order, or build to stock? I expect it's build to order, so production will only be as fast as orders. And I'm sure airlines will not accept delivery of any new planes until this issue is resolved, hence the current halt in production.



- How many orders have been delayed or cancelled by the airlines? I'm sure more are to come. But I also expect lead time to order and receive a plane is quite long, so hard for airlines to jump ship and order something else.


And the $64,000 question.... will this end up killing production of the MAX?

More of the dollar impact will be known when numbers are released in January. However, the impact on Boeing is in the hundreds of billions of dollars and on Southwest and American past the hundreds of millions of dollars into the billions. Routes have been eliminated. Pilots and other workers have lost work and now are receiving some compensation as Boeing compensates the airline. The only one in the industry to really benefit has been Delta as they'd added routes and pilots since they never had any 737 Max's.

Even if the planes were cleared and returned to operation you're talking a huge cost in returning to service and in pilot training. That's on top of the logistic nightmare of handling customer requests as to what plane and avoiding the 737 Max.

737 Max planes are sitting everywhere. There is a tremendous amount of storage available. Ever drive past Opalocka airport and see what looks like a huge plane parking lot or more like a junk yard?

Airlines haven't yet had to take Boeing to court as Boeing has shown a willingness to pay along the way. Pilots sued the airlines, but the airlines started compensating them so the suits are not currently being pursued further.

Boeing builds to order and had huge orders from Southwest and American. The status of those orders is to be determined as it's not yet been relevant and since production is now halted isn't at the moment except for the huge quantity of those planes already built and waiting as Boeing does build ahead to be able to supply to fill the orders.

Not receiving new planes in the short term actually saves the airlines and helps offset the other costs, but you take away a year of shipments of new planes and it will start to impact their available fleet and their costs. One reason for new planes is to lower operating costs. Older fleets do the opposite. You skip hundreds of planes in a year and it will impact you later. There is no way to recover. You can't just order 200 planes for next month.

The dates have continued to move and the latest are no resumption prior to May or June depending on the airline. As those dates are a bit like you're given on flight delays (get told 30 minutes late, then another hour, then another hour just in pieces), there is no reason to think now that April, May or June is accurate.

Other airplane manufacturers have not really benefited as you might think. First, the big Boeing airlines haven't given them any additional orders. Second, they've been scrambling and doing extra to see if they have any issues. Third, the build process is long and slow and they can't really change production significantly in the short run.

Boeing suppliers have been impacted perhaps the hardest. GE, Safran, and Spirit have lost billions and seen their stock values drop many more billions. Shareholder suits have already been filed by Boeing shareholders and likely will be by supplier shareholders as well.

Total insurance payouts are likely to be the largest ever and insurance rates in the industry have already risen more than 10%.

Settlements to date have remained confidential, although the totals will show up in annual reports but Southwest was initially asking for over $400 million for just the period through September and apparently got something in that range as they're giving their employees around $125 million. Southwest had 34 Max's but had over 250 on order.

Now, the numbers tossed around become hard to pin down as the airlines prefer to talk in terms of lost revenues. Clearly they've reduced expenses too but the loss in profits is very difficult to ascertain. Fortunately for them it's hit in a period of tremendous airline profitability where nothing can take away their success. Had it hit at another time in their cycle it would have been blamed for putting them into bankruptcy.

Practical realities require Boeing to settle with all airlines as without the airlines they have no business. They need the airlines as badly as the airlines need them. They must maintain the relationships. They desperately need Southwest and American but both of those airlines need them as badly. You can't replace hundreds of planes on order, that have been on order for years, but just turning elsewhere. No one can make up the lost planes. Boeing stands the best chance of doing it over time.
 
The real question is will this end up killing Boeing?

Highly unlikely. If the **it really hits the fan, they'll declare bankruptcy, cancel all their contracts, restructure their debt, etc. A few big shots will deploy their golden parachutes and the company will move on like nothing much happened. Only people really affected will be the workers and the shareholders at Boeing and at their subcontractors. Most of the parts of modern airliners are subbed out. Boeing is the designer and the final assembler, but most of the actual manufacturing is done by suppliers. For instance, the 737 fuselages arrive in Renton pretty much fully complete from an outside vendor.

Boeing has a lot of other things going on besides commercial aircraft. It's just that commercial aircraft is the part most visible to the general public.
 
Airplanes cost just as much sitting on the ground as they do flying with revenue pax and cargo.
 
All of this again. I could write a book. B&B you forgot another airline...I do believe UAL has the second largest order book behind SWA. Speaking of SWA....who it to blame here??? Why did Boeing abandon a mid sized single aisle airliner(ie 757) to keep stretching the 737 to obscene lengths and operational limitiations??? I am the reciever(and operator) of those marketing decisions.....IOW, I have to fly a 737-900ER loaded to the gills into ORD with an icy runway and a ridiculous approach speed due to all of these Boeing decisions and I am expected to perform even though I have been given a less than perfect platform. Have you ever wondered why Boeing shutdown the 757 line and put all of their eggs in the 737 basket???? The answer is...........SOUTHWEST AIRLINES!!!!! Yes you give the market what it wants. But it isn't like there are a lot of choices out there. So if you are a "Boeing airline", then you really don't have a choice.
But SWA has forced Boeing into making this airplane into what it is instead of doing the proper thing and designing a new generation single aisle airplane.

Another factor was the transistion of management during the MD merger. MD management survived. And they were Wall Street management types....unlike the engineering Boeing types. And this was finally the result of that merger....money versus engineering. There are so many layers to this issue it is mind boggling and the reason I can't really form a coherent point here....othere than there are so many sides to this problem.

Summary:

Boeing ****ed up

Their mistake could have been easily and cheaply avoided but due to bean counters, they pinched every penny they could and this was the result.

SWA pretty much dictates what Boeing does in the single aisle airliner market.

Pilots are left to fly less than optimum aircraft because of all of this.
 
Fly less than a perfect aircraft for the mission?

Try being a helicopter pilot.... :)
 
All of this again. I could write a book. B&B you forgot another airline...I do believe UAL has the second largest order book behind SWA. Speaking of SWA....who it to blame here??? Why did Boeing abandon a mid sized single aisle airliner(ie 757) to keep stretching the 737 to obscene lengths and operational limitiations??? I am the reciever(and operator) of those marketing decisions.....IOW, I have to fly a 737-900ER loaded to the gills into ORD with an icy runway and a ridiculous approach speed due to all of these Boeing decisions and I am expected to perform even though I have been given a less than perfect platform. Have you ever wondered why Boeing shutdown the 757 line and put all of their eggs in the 737 basket???? The answer is...........SOUTHWEST AIRLINES!!!!! Yes you give the market what it wants. But it isn't like there are a lot of choices out there. So if you are a "Boeing airline", then you really don't have a choice.
But SWA has forced Boeing into making this airplane into what it is instead of doing the proper thing and designing a new generation single aisle airplane.

Another factor was the transistion of management during the MD merger. MD management survived. And they were Wall Street management types....unlike the engineering Boeing types. And this was finally the result of that merger....money versus engineering. There are so many layers to this issue it is mind boggling and the reason I can't really form a coherent point here....othere than there are so many sides to this problem.

Summary:

Boeing ****ed up

Their mistake could have been easily and cheaply avoided but due to bean counters, they pinched every penny they could and this was the result.

SWA pretty much dictates what Boeing does in the single aisle airliner market.

Pilots are left to fly less than optimum aircraft because of all of this.

I agree with all you've said about Southwest. They're incredible at PR and it often hides some other aspects of how they do business. Boeing definitely wasn't in this alone and the blindness the airlines claim is ridiculous. We know they got complaints from pilots and on their own they should have investigated diligently after the first crash.

I think this isn't just a mark on Boeing, but one on an industry, on every airline flying 737 Max's, on every airline not listening to their pilots, on everyone putting dollars ahead of safety. The first plane went down and the airline and country were considered and it was said, "couldn't happen to us." Even the second airplane got the same reaction. It's no different than the boating world and owners not listening to captains and engineers or having management companies control things with costs being their single concern. Every time a pilot flies a plane or a captain sails a ship that they have concerns about, but they need to protect their jobs, we all lose. The solution to the 737 Max fiasco, needs to go far beyond the safety of the plane itself but examine the entire system. An industry's credibility is at stake.

I think you're likely correct on UAL, just weren't flying as many as American. American and Southwest tend to come up together on that basis and the proximity of their headquarters.
 
And Beoing is absorbing most of these costs...not the airlines.

A lot of those costs are being absorbed by the Boeing subcontractors. They have to deliver to the Boeing schedule, but they don't get paid until the aircraft is delivered to the final customer. All those parts in the MAXs that are in the Boeing parking lots have not been paid for yet. Same thing happened when the 787 was delayed and then grounded. Even some pretty big companies that were Boeing suppliers (like the supplier of most of the 787 cockpit and flight control equipment) were hurting a lot for a couple of years because of the delays to the 787. No reason to think that the MAX is any different.

Boeing may be liable for delays to the final customer, probably not to the suppliers.

There is some concern that some of the suppliers cannot weather a prolonged shutdown of 737 manufacturing. They may either go out of business or seek business elsewhere that may interfere with their ability to resume Boeing part production when the MAX line starts up again.

FWIW, most of the orders for the MAX were from Asian airlines. About 1/10 of the MAX production is going to go to NA operators based on the published order book. Yes, SWA had the biggest single order (for about 300 airplanes), but the total order book is over 5700 planes. I'm not sure that SWA was the sole customer input to the MAX design.
 
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A lot of those costs are being absorbed by the Boeing subcontractors. They have to deliver to the Boeing schedule, but they don't get paid until the aircraft is delivered to the final customer. All those parts in the MAXs that are in the Boeing parking lots have not been paid for yet. Same thing happened when the 787 was delayed and then grounded. Even some pretty big companies that were Boeing suppliers (like the supplier of most of the 787 cockpit and flight control equipment) were hurting a lot for a couple of years because of the delays to the 787. No reason to think that the MAX is any different.

Boeing may be liable for delays to the final customer, probably not to the suppliers.

There is some concern that some of the suppliers cannot weather a prolonged shutdown of 737 manufacturing. They may either go out of business or seek business elsewhere that may interfere with their ability to resume Boeing part production when the MAX line starts up again.

FWIW, most of the orders for the MAX were from Asian airlines. About 1/10 of the MAX production is going to go to NA operators based on the published order book. Yes, SWA had the biggest single order (for about 300 airplanes), but the total order book is over 5700 planes. I'm not sure that SWA was the sole customer input to the MAX design.

The order book of 5700 planes means nothing as it goes out years. I only look at the current year's planned deliveries.

I think there are real worries on the suppliers, but Boeing will need to assist them in survival, not to be nice, but Boeing needs them.
 
Less 'cause there's no crew cost or fuel burn.
Like the "Yes Minister" hospital. State of the art,efficient, clean, immaculately kept but, no patients.
No income either. Standing costs continue unabated,unless Boeing is paying.
So, is there a beneficiary to this mess? Airbus? FF will hate that! A new startup? Is Boeing is too big for that to happen? Or to fail?
Qantas says it has chosen Airbus A350-1000 over Boeing 777X for its proposed non stop long haul services.Could be "public negotiating mischief" on Qantas`s part.
 
I'm with Baker, this is a management issue, not an engineering issue.

McNerney competed with Immalt and Nardelli to succeed Jack Welch at GE.

Boy, did those three leave a wake of destruction behind them in corporate America. In a just world, CEOs would be accountable for their actions, and not just walk away with a golden parachute.
 
Like the "Yes Minister" hospital. State of the art,efficient, clean, immaculately kept but, no patients. ....

But think about how nice hospitals could be without all the sick people.
 
Of course if Boeing did not install the system , and simply put a line in the flight manual.

" light aircraft with rearward CG may require trimming after takeoff",, there would not be any problem.
 
Of course if Boeing did not install the system , and simply put a line in the flight manual.

" light aircraft with rearward CG may require trimming after takeoff",, there would not be any problem.


Maybe, but the proper course would have been: "This is a new airplane, you will need to acquire a new simulator for 'differences training.'"


They allowed the salesmen in Chicago to override the corporate expertise which resides in Seattle.
 
Of course if Boeing did not install the system , and simply put a line in the flight manual.

" light aircraft with rearward CG may require trimming after takeoff",, there would not be any problem.

Actually, no.

That's not the situation that MCAS was designed for.

The AFM should have said "If the AOA sensor in use fails, the aircraft will head for the ground. If you don't perform the appropriate remedial action within 4 seconds, you can kiss your **s goodbye."
 
Maybe, but the proper course would have been: "This is a new airplane, you will need to acquire a new simulator for 'differences training.'"...

Except that the simulator is programmed to train the pilots what's in the AFM. If the MCAS system was not in the AFM, it may not have been modeled in the sim. Even if it was, it may have been the original design version, not the MCAS system that eventually evolved and was delivered in the aircraft. Further, since the failure mode that seems to have occurred was not anticipated by the MCAS system designers, this also would probably not have been in the sim.

If you require a new sim, you are not doing "differences training".
 
The bottom line is that MCAS is not a critical system. The airplane is completely flyable without it. It would only activate in very rare situations. It should have been given two inputs and a (comparator)light. When that light illuminates, then there is a checklist in the QRH to deal with it. It should also have never been given that much authority...and it was not given that much authority originally.

The QRH checklist should have read something like:

Condition:
One AOA input sensor to MCAS has failed and MCAS has been deactivated

-Maintain airspeeds above 1.3Vso and if at airspeeds at 1.3Vso or lower, limit bank angle to 15 degrees or 30 degrees at any airpseed above 1.3Vso

Note: MCAS is a pitch augmentation system that activates at high angles of attack. The 737Max demonstrated a tendency to pitch UP at high angles of attack. High angles of attack should be avoided when this system is inop. Normal flight maneuvers at normal airspeeds at certifiedweights should avoid the envelop where MCAS is needed.

__________________________________________________________________

All you would need is a paragraph in the flight manual and a segment in the computer based training and that would have been fine. Hell you could even give a quick explanatioin in the QRH like I did above. It is totally common to do this.

In the end, this spotlighted some very serious cultural issues at Boeing. And that is the reason the Max is not flying. The fix should be quite simple.
 
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I manage the development of high criticality aircraft software. I was not part of the Max MCAS design, but I have much experience with that sort of thing.

In my opinion, this wasn't the CEOs fault. Nor was it Management's, Production's, or the Regulator's fault.

In modern planes the pilot is totally disconnected from flight controls. The pilot's input feeds into computers, and very complex software decides what to do with the flight controls based on that input.

That software involves hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of lines of code. Because human interpretation is removed from the equation, that code must understand every conceivable condition, combination of events, combination of failures, and corner cases. This is impossible, so the code at least tries to alert the pilot when things are caddywonkers and it gets confused, and hopefully the pilot has the knowledge and ability to override the software and make manual corrections.

I believe the situation with the two Max crashes was a sensor failure, software making wrong flight control adjustments based on the failure, lack of indication of the failure to the pilot, and lack of knowledge (training) by the pilot on what to do about it. That's a whole bunch of what-ifs combined together. There's no way software can anticipate and address every possible combination of what-ifs.

In the old days, a simple pitch issue is felt by the pilot, he trims accordingly, and all is well. Those days are gone. To be fair, the new fly-by-software methodology does result in much safer planes than the "old days" (even the Max, with these crashes, has a better safety record than planes from 20+ years ago), but I think we're going to see more of these corner case situations that befuddle the software and result in aircraft failures.
 
In the end, this spotlighted some very serious cultural issues at Boeing. And that is the reason the Max is not flying. The fix should be quite simple.

Should be but clearly hasn't been. 370 planes in use, 5000 on order. And now they're hoping for late spring of maybe early summer, but based on all dates to this point, I'd say sometime in 2020 is likely a safer bet. I wonder how many on which production had started or were finished and on hand at Boeing. Supposedly they had built and parked 400 planes. Before production halted, it had slowed to 41 per month.

And now, when they decide to resume, what about their suppliers? How quickly can they resume? GE increased the percentage of engine production allocated to Airbus. Other suppliers have shut down or curtailed production or sold to others.
 
Should be but clearly hasn't been. 370 planes in use, 5000 on order. And now they're hoping for late spring of maybe early summer, but based on all dates to this point, I'd say sometime in 2020 is likely a safer bet. I wonder how many on which production had started or were finished and on hand at Boeing. Supposedly they had built and parked 400 planes. Before production halted, it had slowed to 41 per month.

And now, when they decide to resume, what about their suppliers? How quickly can they resume? GE increased the percentage of engine production allocated to Airbus. Other suppliers have shut down or curtailed production or sold to others.

Supposedly, it'll take Boeing about 15 months to get all the parked planes out to the customers if they get approval to deliver them.
 
...In my opinion, this wasn't the CEOs fault. Nor was it Management's, Production's, or the Regulator's fault....

That software involves hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of lines of code. Because human interpretation is removed from the equation, that code must understand every conceivable condition, combination of events, combination of failures, and corner cases. This is impossible, so the code at least tries to alert the pilot when things are caddywonkers and it gets confused, and hopefully the pilot has the knowledge and ability to override the software and make manual corrections.

I believe the situation with the two Max crashes was a sensor failure, software making wrong flight control adjustments based on the failure, lack of indication of the failure to the pilot, and lack of knowledge (training) by the pilot on what to do about it. That's a whole bunch of what-ifs combined together. There's no way software can anticipate and address every possible combination of what-ifs....

So who is responsible? Are you saying that airplane software are so complex that no one can know what they will do in all situations and so we say "Oh well, **it sometimes happens." and we move on?

It seems that the MAX issue was a combination of the MCAS system doing more than was originally intended, a failure of imagination on the part of the designers/programmers to consider certain faults, and the decision by someone in charge not to tell the pilots that it even existed in the first place.

Only one of these things could have happened by accident or an oversight.
 
"So who is responsible?"


Boeing management. And the FAA. For a few reasons:


I worked at Boeing Everett doing preflight and delivery of the first Dreamliner to ANA. We knew about the issues with the lithium batteries before the 1st plane was delivered. I personally changed two of them that smoked. We brought it up to the engineers, nothing was done and a year later one of them slagged with passengers aboard. Not as bad as this as the plane was still on the ground, but same trailing issue. Fleet grounded. Half baked fix of casing the battery with a steel box so it won't kill the airplane when the battery slags.
It's Boeing's fault for covering that up to keep stock prices high in the face of already delayed delivery dates.


It's the FAA's fault for making the type certificate so bloody hard to change. We could have converted to off the shelf NiCad batteries in a matter of days, but the aircraft wasn't cert'd for it so we couldn't. And I'm sure the customers would be happier having the heavier battery for reliability rather than lightweight and dangerous battery wrapped up in heavy steel box.
For the Max, a secondary AOA along with wiring to the Air Data system(ADS) and some software changes would be the right and easy(ish) fix. Problem is that the FAA will demand a new type cert which would take years and $$$$. CAT III, RVSR, Stall avoidance and any other system that uses the ADS would all have to be recertified. Thus the incentive for Boeing to cover it up.
 
I manage the development of high criticality aircraft software. I was not part of the Max MCAS design, but I have much experience with that sort of thing.

In my opinion, this wasn't the CEOs fault. Nor was it Management's, Production's, or the Regulator's fault.

In modern planes the pilot is totally disconnected from flight controls. The pilot's input feeds into computers, and very complex software decides what to do with the flight controls based on that input.

That software involves hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of lines of code. Because human interpretation is removed from the equation, that code must understand every conceivable condition, combination of events, combination of failures, and corner cases. This is impossible, so the code at least tries to alert the pilot when things are caddywonkers and it gets confused, and hopefully the pilot has the knowledge and ability to override the software and make manual corrections.

I believe the situation with the two Max crashes was a sensor failure, software making wrong flight control adjustments based on the failure, lack of indication of the failure to the pilot, and lack of knowledge (training) by the pilot on what to do about it. That's a whole bunch of what-ifs combined together. There's no way software can anticipate and address every possible combination of what-ifs.

In the old days, a simple pitch issue is felt by the pilot, he trims accordingly, and all is well. Those days are gone. To be fair, the new fly-by-software methodology does result in much safer planes than the "old days" (even the Max, with these crashes, has a better safety record than planes from 20+ years ago), but I think we're going to see more of these corner case situations that befuddle the software and result in aircraft failures.

With all due resepct....you are WAY off on this one!!! The 737 is not a very automated airplane....it is a continuation of a VERY NON automated airplane. The logic in any flight control systems is extremely basic. The "problem" with 737s is that it requires a PILOT to fly it....unlike the Airbus you might be alluding to... There is no "input feed" into computers for a 737 to decipher. It is bell cranks and pulleys that go to hydraulic actuators that move the control surfaces. There are "computers" that do augment some of the flight controls...MCAS is one of them. But these computers are extremely crude....MCAS inlcuded. I am not going to go into it again as you can read my previous post. But you really don't know what you are talking about on this one. To put it another way, a 737 is NOT fly by wire....not even close!!!!
 
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With all due resepct....you are WAY off on this one!!! The 737 is not a very automated airplane....it is a continuation of a VERY NON automated airplane. The logic in any flight control systems is extremely basic. The "problem" with 737s is that it requires a PILOT to fly it....unlike the Airbus you might be alluding to... There is no "input feed" into computers for a 737 to decipher. It is bell cranks and pulleys that go to hydraulic actuators that move the control surfaces. There are "computers" that do augment some of the flight controls...MCAS is one of them. But these computers are extremely crude....MCAS inlcuded. I am not going to go into it again as you can read my previous post. But you really don't know what you are talking about on this one. To put it another way, a 737 is NOT fly by wire....not even close!!!!

Further to this, because the flight controls on the MAX are mechanical, the only way for Boeing to change the flight control "feel" sensed by the pilot was to have the MCAS system mistrim the airplane.
 
Baker, you are correct. I learned me something here. My experience is with the 787, 777, 747-8 abd Boeing military planes, which are indeed fly by wire. As I mentioned, I wasn't involved in the 373 development. I did a little snooping and was surprised to learn that the 737 Max, despite it's advanced avionics, still maintains the original 737 flight controls. It is interesting however that the one aspect of the Max flight controls that is computer controlled, the MCAS system, is at the center of what brought these planes down.
 
Well over a year since this thread started:


Re-Certification Flights Begin for Boeing 737 MAX

https://www.usnews.com/news/best-st...ertification-flights-begin-for-boeing-737-max

SEATTLE (AP) — A Boeing 737 MAX took off from a Seattle airport on Monday, the start of three days of re-certification test flights that mark a step toward returning the aircraft to passenger service.

The Federal Aviation Administration test flights over the next three days will evaluate Boeing’s proposed changes to the automated flight control system on the MAX. This is the software called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that activated erroneously on two flights that crashed, killing 346 people. Since the second accident in March 2019, the jet has been grounded.


The Seattle Times reports the plane flew east and landed one hour and 20 minutes later at Moses Lake, Washington, and was due to return to Boeing Field early in the afternoon.

Boeing has over the past year made multiple changes to its plans for updating the airplane’s systems. The start of these re-certification flights indicates that Boeing has finalized its changes and turned them in to the FAA.
 
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A year ago, airlines thought they needed it. Now no one does. All airlines have more planes today than they require.
 

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