Boeing 737 MAX

[Seevee]

"Yea, the slow spool up on the 727 did cause a few really bad landings. I wasn't a huge fan of that plane, ya never knew if it would give you a good or bad landing."

All the jet engines of that era had a slow spool up time from flight idle..

The 727 gear were behind the center of rotation , so is someone attempted to flair the plane, as they would for other aircraft to slow the rate of descent, it simply banged the gear harder on to the runway.

Smooth 727 landings were a learned skill, not a matter of luck.

FF,

I could argue landing that plane did contain a bit of luck. It was very hard to predict exactly when the gear would touch down and the slightest imperfection in landing technique (or outside forces, wind/gust) would make a hard landing. I only had about 2500 hours in that plane, some as an engineer, and while I could do pretty well on landings, occasionally one would bite me. And not much different than the guys with 10,000 hours in that plane. The other Boeings were significantly easier to land.

 

[Seevee]

ssobol,

Really good review of the aircraft.

 

[FF]

Poor flying skills may be the big problem , even with well trained US pilots.

The FAA requires 2 hours of "off" time for every flight hour, over 8 hours.

The companies have discovered its cheaper to install a couple of extra pilots on long over water flights' so seat hopping every crew member can stay under 8 hours , OK to sleep fast and turnaround.

The hassle is with 3 or 4 pilots and only 2 landings , one going out, one on arrival at home landings must be logged to have each crew member be FAA current.

Add this to the companies desire to have the AP fly as it is fuel cheaper and lots of folks warm a seat for thousands of hours but do not increase their skill set.

Therefore the desire to automate as much as can be done.

This is seldom a hassle for junior folks that may do 5-7 legs a day .

 

[ssobol]

... The 727 gear were behind the center of rotation ....

For tricycle gear airplanes (i.e. most of them), when the plane is on the ground the center of rotation is the main gear. When in the air, it is the center of gravity. If the plane is on the ground and the center of gravity moves behind the main gear, the plane will sit on its tail. For takeoffs and landings you want the CG to be a bit in front of the gear rotation point. The farther forward the CG is from the gear, the harder it is to get the plane to rotate for takeoff. You pretty much design the airplane so that the CG is always in front of the gear when the plane is operating (there are a few exceptions, but they only occur when the plane is in flight).

Occasionally aircraft that are being loaded have tilted back onto their tails because of too much stuff being in the back before the stuff in the front was loaded. Usually this is countered by a strut the ground crew puts under the tail. Some operators tie the nose gear to the ground during loading (e.g. FedEx).

As planes get longer the risk of a tail sit is greater. Nowadays you will see that the ground crew puts struts under the tails of Boeing 737-900s because there is a risk that as passenger leave the plane (front passengers first) and the front baggage hold is emptied, all the people still in the back could cause a problem.

 

[Seevee]

Poor flying skills may be the big problem , even with well trained US pilots.

The FAA requires 2 hours of "off" time for every flight hour, over 8 hours.

The companies have discovered its cheaper to install a couple of extra pilots on long over water flights' so seat hopping every crew member can stay under 8 hours , OK to sleep fast and turnaround.

There is not other option for long flights, ya can't just beam another crew up there.....

The hassle is with 3 or 4 pilots and only 2 landings , one going out, one on arrival at home landings must be logged to have each crew member be FAA current.

That's true, but that's what recurrent landings are for. I did that as a senior FO on the 747 where I got a ton of time off, but did do the recurrent on a regular basis.

Add this to the companies desire to have the AP fly as it is fuel cheaper and lots of folks warm a seat for thousands of hours but do not increase their skill set.

Therefore the desire to automate as much as can be done.

Personally, I feel the autopilot thing is over emphasized. I could argue to turn it off for a big part of the departure or approach/landing phase. It's just more fun. But nothing wrong with it when required or things get really busy. We did have a few guy that did a little as possible and hated the job, and wonder if they could really fly when the chips were down. I suggested they get a job at Walmart.... without success.

This is seldom a hassle for junior folks that may do 5-7 legs a day .

As to the MAX, I don't believe that seniority is a big issue with the skill of the pilots. It's not a really long range plane so the pilot's should get plenty of landings to stay current. And landings really isn't the issue with the Max issue. It's a lack of training or information or procedures (or all of the above) in dealing with a Max failure.

 

[FF]

There is not other option for long flights, ya can't just beam another crew up there.....

The old way , 25+ hour layovers is legal, but sucks!

 

[jftr88]

If you go here to this pilots channel he explains the mcas and what could happen with it.

Mentour Pilot youtube channel

Look for Boeing 737 Stall Escape manoeuvre, why MAX needs MCAS!! video



should be one of the more recent ones. Right at the top.


Really good explanation of the mcas and what can happen.

 

[ProMaritime]

From: Capt. Jack M. Schmidt, Ret.
Major Airline

No less than five people have called me to say, "Hey dude I'm booked on a MAX-8 to go to Timbuktu soon, what do I do? My answer...better get your affairs in order and, oh, by the way...that life insurance policy of yours...make sure it's paid up…and my full name is "Jack M. Schmidt, Jr." make sure you get the Jr. in there. If the money goes to my dad's estate my brother would get half...don't want that to happen now, do we?

Seriously, the short version is (ah s--t there ain’t no short version) in the fifties, sixties and seventies two-bit third world countries were starting up their own national airlines and they wanted their own citizens to fly the airplanes. But most couldn't ride a freaking camel, let alone fly an airplane, so at first the Americans, Brits, Aussies, Kiwis and a few Irishmen got these jobs. When I worked for Northwest we sold airplanes to Onassis (Olympic Airlines) in Greece (maybe 2nd world) and the Union of Burma Airline. We opened pilot bases in Athens and Rangoon. (I bid them both but the bids went senior so I got Honolulu.) The company staffed them with NW pilots to train the locals how to fly the Boeing 720 and 727.

Hell, the CEO at Emirates today, the world’s premier airline, is an Englishman.

Fast forward to the eighties, along comes Airbus with cockpit automation to die for (literally) which make it "almost" impossible to f--k...er screw up and crash the airplane. The French actually said "impossible" (yeah right). Even though their prototype A-320 crashed at the Paris Air Show in 1988, the “Bus” smoked Boeing's 737 in sales efforts (no pun intended). The 737 is still being cranked out on a Type Certificate that was issued by the FAA in 1967 even though today's versions bear no resemblance to the 1967 version. Especially on the MAX-8/9 series on which the wings, engines and cockpit automation have all been "upgraded."

Here is how s--t happens. My information is this: Boeing, on the MAX, moved the engines forward, but looking at the pictures, it appears to me that they may have moved the entire wing, engines and all, forward. This moves the CG forward along with the Mean Aerodynamic Cord which affects trim (tech talk but could be a bad thing). You do this because you think the computers that are flying the airplane most of the time can more easily recover from a stall with a forward CG. (I guess crashing is one way to recover from a stall but it’s never been my favorite.) Next you realize there might be a problem with a nose-heavy airplane (duh!) so you design software to counter act but you only give the computers that are flying the airplane access to one channel of data from the pitot-static and/or the air data computers which may deliver faulty or corrupted data. (Even though most every modern airplane has three complete and independent systems, the MAX only has two.) Next the guys you sold this turkey to put one (if not both) inexperienced and poorly trained pilots in the cockpit. Air France did this with a different model of the Airbus and they put it into the Atlantic off Brazil.

This is a disgusting exercise in technology for technologies sake (and to sell airplanes) that didn't work out, designed by aeronautical and software engineers just out of school who are supervised by 28-year old “senior” engineers, none of whom have a freaking clue how to fly an airplane. Ask my son, he went through this at General Atomics Aeronautical Systems on the Predator. Then you make sure the only real pilots you expose this fraud to are your in-house test pilots who like their jobs and wouldn't say
s--t if they had a mouth full.

Previously it was “If’n it ain’t Boeing, I ain’t going” now changed to “If it is Boeing, I ain’t going”

"THIS IS THE END MY FRIEND" – Jim Morrison of The Doors from the movie “Apocalypse Now”

First Airbus A320 Crash - French Air show -

 

[garychurch]

FAA's mission statement to "promote aviation" was removed from their charter in 1996 by an act of Congress.

 

[ProMaritime]

True, but the FAA's mission and mandate for air safety was not. And at this they have failed consistently, like all government bureaucracies.

 

[Boat]

Wow, I can't believe how stupid I've been all of this time. I should have seen it years ago. This is irrefutable proof that Boeing doesn't know a thing about designing and building airplanes.

Doncha know every time a self-driving car kills someone the same people are going to be saying "The end of the world. We are all going to die."

If that was today, we would probably have 100 people killed in conventional motor vehicles and another hundred killed by the opium epidemic. Medical mistakes kill the equivalent of a jumbo jet load of people a week. That is just in this country. Neither of these plane crashes were in this country. Those lives do matter but you can't tell it by people's reactions.

Hysteria. Plane crashes bring them out of the woodwork.

I hate flying commercial, it's a cattle call, but even with all of recent events I would not hesitate to jump on any Boeing today if the need arose.


I do miss the Constellation. Someone should build a few hundred for old times' sake.

 

[psneeld]

True, but the FAA's mission and mandate for air safety was not. And at this they have failed consistently, like all government bureaucracies.

Well, I just hope the USCG fails if you ever need them.


Here is a story about private enterprise and possible failures and someone has to take a cheapshot at "all" government agencies.


I am so sick and tired of so much negativity, especially when so many people I know really kinda suck at whatever THEY do, but shoot off their mouths at everyone else.


Especially in cases like this where there is always more to the story.

 

[ProMaritime]

I said nothing about the Boeings of the past. I have flown the Boeing 727, 707 and am type rated in the Boeing DHC-7, 757 and 767 as well as the Douglas DC-9, MD-80 Series and the McDonald Douglas DC-10, all excellent airplanes built by companies that were run by real aviation people, not lawyers, bean-counters and Wall Street commodities traders like the one's that broke Northwest. Those products were not designed by thirty-somethings techies who think they can mask basic aerodynamic faults with computer magic. And, they were not commanded by pilots who lacked basic flying skills and in-depth training and experience. It's the world we live.

 

[psneeld]

What has all that to do with your general statement bashing government bureaucracies?

 

[Insequent]

A pity dear old Marin got himself banned a while back. He was always saying how good these 20-somethings were, and that very soon pilots would not be required at all. I wonder how he would have defended the tech?

 

[sunchaser]

A pity dear old Marin got himself banned a while back. He was always saying how good these 20-somethings were, and that very soon pilots would not be required at all. I wonder how he would have defended the tech?

I've been wondering the same thing.

 

[BruceK]

A pity dear old Marin got himself banned a while back. He was always saying how good these 20-somethings were, and that very soon pilots would not be required at all. I wonder how he would have defended the tech?

Marin could,and did,argue night was day, with surprising success.

Given a little time,with the aircraft grounded,the unpalatable truths of the Max issue seem to be emerging.

 

[ssobol]

... Boeing, on the MAX, moved the engines forward, but looking at the pictures, it appears to me that they may have moved the entire wing, engines and all, forward. This moves the CG forward along with the Mean Aerodynamic Cord which affects trim (tech talk but could be a bad thing). ...

Generally speaking a forward CG improves aircraft stability. Aft CG causes lots of problems. The handling issue with the MAX is related to the power of the new engines compared to the power of the horizontal stab and elevators.

 

[FF]

The "newest" aviation research effort is for very high aspect ratio wings to lower induced drag.

Problem is the wings can warp and bend and do strange things like flutter.

The solution seems to be more computers , just to keep the wing together.

So we all had better get used to more computers being in place , and less the flight crew can do to actually fly the bird.

 

[Brisyboy]

Hmmmm................ with all the info appearing about how the computers were critically involved and how pilots were kept in the dark about the "secret" involvement of the computer because the manufacturer didn`t think they needed to know, perhaps all those early posters at the beginning of this thread who were quick to denegrate the ability of the foreign pilots should have a rethink?

 

[Delfin]

I said nothing about the Boeings of the past. I have flown the Boeing 727, 707 and am type rated in the Boeing DHC-7, 757 and 767 as well as the Douglas DC-9, MD-80 Series and the McDonald Douglas DC-10, all excellent airplanes built by companies that were run by real aviation people, not lawyers, bean-counters and Wall Street commodities traders like the one's that broke Northwest. Those products were not designed by thirty-somethings techies who think they can mask basic aerodynamic faults with computer magic. And, they were not commanded by pilots who lacked basic flying skills and in-depth training and experience. It's the world we live.

I can't remember the name of the book, but I read one on the history of Airbus and Boeing. It was published at least 15 years ago, but it discussed the difference in design philosophy between Airbus, who wanted the plane to fly itself and Boeing, who build airplanes for pilots, which is why, I think, so many pilots prefer Boeing aircraft. As the technology has become more complex, it is inevitable that more computerized controls are introduced, with the potential for component failure. My understanding is that Boeing is trying to ensure that pilots can override such failures and just fly the plane. We don't know yet whether this issue was an uncorrectable problem, a problem caused by the pilots, or a problem that could have been solved by the pilots who lacked the training/experience to do so.

An example of where this all may be headed is the B-2 bomber, which is just a flying wing. To keep that in the air, computerized controls are essential and if the computers fail, a human being simply lacks the ability to deal with the flight characteristics and just fly the plane, so it comes down. Is the future of aviation robot pilots? Seems like a real possibility....

And I wouldn't be too critical of the FAA. Whatever their shortcomings, air fatalities have been declining for years while traffic has increased. That doesn't happen by itself and the FAA can take some, or a lot of the credit.

 

[Seevee]

Here's the latest report on the MCAS.

Basically: The design was originally intended for the MCAS to limit elevator movements to .6 degrees and ended up. The flawed certification process as Boeing and the FAA rushed to bring the new jet to market ended up allowing movement to 2.5d at a time (half the total movement).

Also the MCAS gets input from only one angle of attack, and when the MCAS moved the elevator it had enough power to overcome the pilot's attempts to oppose it.

Read the details below:

+++++++++++++++++++
My comment: This major design flaw really should have been caught, however, not training pilots and giving them the information to disable the system, boarders on criminal. That's certainly NOT the Boeing we've all grown to love.

There have been many design flaws and failures on certified aircraft over the years.... and there's been some fatal results. But this one almost seems blatant. We have a system of checks and balances that failed here. We have checklists, co pilots, mechanic and design supervisors, procedures, etc., etc. to prevent this sort of thing.

This didn't happen just because one guy screwed up.



+++++++++++++++++++
MCAS Certification Flawed: Report

RUSS NILES

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation (MCAS) system at the center of investigations into two fatal crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 was misunderstood and mischaracterized in a flawed certification process as Boeing and the FAA rushed to bring the new jet to market, a Seattle Times investigation published Sunday alleges.

Citing named and unnamed sources, the Times’ Dominic Gates says the final certification of the system, which was intended to give pilots a control feel on the aerodynamically different MAX similar to that of previous iterations of the 737, not only gave “unlimited authority” to the stabilizer for nose-down trim, it literally fought the pilots’ attempts to correct the condition possibly to the point where they were physically unable to fight the stabilizer down force any longer.

“It had full authority to move the stabilizer the full amount,” Peter Lemme, former Boeing flight controls engineer, told the Times. “There was no need for that. Nobody should have agreed to giving it unlimited authority.”

The Times story said the profound ability of the system to take over a key flight control action should have resulted in close scrutiny in the certification process.

But the original specifications of the system called for MCAS to limit its ability to move the horizontal stabilizer .6 degrees at a time. By the time deliveries began, it could pitch the stabilizer 2.5 degrees, about half its total travel, in one movement, the result of flight testing tweaks aimed at finessing the flight control feel.

The system would also pivot the stabilizer that much repeatedly as long as data inputs indicated the aircraft was about to stall, regardless of the pilots’ strenuous efforts to overpower the system. In the October Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people, the flight data recorder counted the captain countering the system 21 times with the first officer taking over for few tries before the captain’s final futile efforts to arrest a 500-MPH dive. The data indicated the nose-down yoke forces peaked at a little more than 100 pounds.

The newspaper’s investigation said that engineers involved in the safety assessment of MCAS were not aware the system could move the tail five times more than the original specs called for. The certification documents should have been amended to reflect the final configuration but they apparently were not, according to the Times report. If they had been, the seriousness of a potential failure of the system would have required it to receive data from at least two sources.

MCAS gets data from only one of two angle of attack indicators on the MAX and the flight data recorder on the Lion Air airplane showed the AOA feeding MCAS was malfunctioning. “A hazardous failure mode depending on a single sensor, I don’t think passes muster,” said Lemme.

The newspaper is reporting that Boeing’s software fix will wire MCAS to both AOAs and only allow the system to move the tail feathers once, instead of repeatedly battling manual control inputs. It will also require additional pilot training and operating manual changes, both of which were called for by pilots unions following the Lion Air crash.

Boeing’s position, endorsed by the FAA, has been that because MCAS is only supposed to trigger in extreme circumstances—high angles of attack and accelerated stalls—that additional pilot training was not necessary. The company has also said that it assumed that based on their existing training on earlier models pilots would recognize the erroneous nose-down commands and hit cutoff switches that would disable the system. This is a standard runaway trim scenario for all aircraft.

“The assumptions in here are incorrect. The human factors were not properly evaluated,” the Times quoted an unnamed FAA safety engineer as saying.

The story also suggests that due to budget cuts the FAA’s certification managers were under increasing pressure to delegate more and more of the safety assessments to Boeing itself. The unprecedented levels of self-certification in the MAX were compounded by the urgency to get the airplane into service because of competitive pressure from Airbus’s new A320neo series. “There wasn’t a complete and proper review of the documents,” the former FAA engineer is quoted as saying. “Review was rushed to reach certain certification dates.”

 

[Seevee]

A note about aircraft stability....

Pitch is probably the most critical item in keeping an aircraft stabile. And a pitch failure that can't be corrected ranks up there with a fire or loosing a flight control surface...... serious stuff.

Now, when a computer takes over the pitch, or even helps with the pitch, there should be some solid ways to disconnect it and recover pitch control. Most aircraft (larger ones) have the trim controlled by a computer when the autopilot is on, and a few have control when the autopilot is off, like the MAX. In both cases ya need a plan B if things don't work.

Personally, I'd prefer NO auto trim control on my plane, even with the autopilot on.

I've had the experience of a runaway trim that couldn't be noticed until the autopilot kicked off the the plane tried to go straight up. That was an exciting ride. That was a small plane, but have had a few trim issues in larger planes that had better warning and able to counteract any nasty things.

For my personal plane, my autopilot does not control the trim, and I like it that way. However, not a solution in larger planes when people move around in the plane causing a constant retrimming, however slight.

 

[jftr88]

If you go here to this pilots channel he explains the mcas and what could happen with it.

Mentour Pilot youtube channel

Look for Boeing 737 Stall Escape manoeuvre, why MAX needs MCAS!! video



should be one of the more recent ones. Right at the top.


Really good explanation of the mcas and what can happen


He is a current 737 captain. And explains that if you are already in high angle of attack and try to push down nose and jam the throttles wide open fast not slowly and steady the thrust from the engines will push the aircraft into a even higher angle of attack at which time it is almost impossible to recover from so slow steady increase throttle

 

[Delfin]

Here's the latest report on the MCAS.

Basically: The design was originally intended for the MCAS to limit elevator movements to .6 degrees and ended up. The flawed certification process as Boeing and the FAA rushed to bring the new jet to market ended up allowing movement to 2.5d at a time (half the total movement).

Also the MCAS gets input from only one angle of attack, and when the MCAS moved the elevator it had enough power to overcome the pilot's attempts to oppose it.

Read the details below:

+++++++++++++++++++
My comment: This major design flaw really should have been caught, however, not training pilots and giving them the information to disable the system, boarders on criminal. That's certainly NOT the Boeing we've all grown to love.

There have been many design flaws and failures on certified aircraft over the years.... and there's been some fatal results. But this one almost seems blatant. We have a system of checks and balances that failed here. We have checklists, co pilots, mechanic and design supervisors, procedures, etc., etc. to prevent this sort of thing.

This didn't happen just because one guy screwed up.



+++++++++++++++++++
MCAS Certification Flawed: Report

RUSS NILES

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation (MCAS) system at the center of investigations into two fatal crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 was misunderstood and mischaracterized in a flawed certification process as Boeing and the FAA rushed to bring the new jet to market, a Seattle Times investigation published Sunday alleges.

Citing named and unnamed sources, the Times’ Dominic Gates says the final certification of the system, which was intended to give pilots a control feel on the aerodynamically different MAX similar to that of previous iterations of the 737, not only gave “unlimited authority” to the stabilizer for nose-down trim, it literally fought the pilots’ attempts to correct the condition possibly to the point where they were physically unable to fight the stabilizer down force any longer.

“It had full authority to move the stabilizer the full amount,” Peter Lemme, former Boeing flight controls engineer, told the Times. “There was no need for that. Nobody should have agreed to giving it unlimited authority.”

The Times story said the profound ability of the system to take over a key flight control action should have resulted in close scrutiny in the certification process.

But the original specifications of the system called for MCAS to limit its ability to move the horizontal stabilizer .6 degrees at a time. By the time deliveries began, it could pitch the stabilizer 2.5 degrees, about half its total travel, in one movement, the result of flight testing tweaks aimed at finessing the flight control feel.

The system would also pivot the stabilizer that much repeatedly as long as data inputs indicated the aircraft was about to stall, regardless of the pilots’ strenuous efforts to overpower the system. In the October Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people, the flight data recorder counted the captain countering the system 21 times with the first officer taking over for few tries before the captain’s final futile efforts to arrest a 500-MPH dive. The data indicated the nose-down yoke forces peaked at a little more than 100 pounds.

The newspaper’s investigation said that engineers involved in the safety assessment of MCAS were not aware the system could move the tail five times more than the original specs called for. The certification documents should have been amended to reflect the final configuration but they apparently were not, according to the Times report. If they had been, the seriousness of a potential failure of the system would have required it to receive data from at least two sources.

MCAS gets data from only one of two angle of attack indicators on the MAX and the flight data recorder on the Lion Air airplane showed the AOA feeding MCAS was malfunctioning. “A hazardous failure mode depending on a single sensor, I don’t think passes muster,” said Lemme.

The newspaper is reporting that Boeing’s software fix will wire MCAS to both AOAs and only allow the system to move the tail feathers once, instead of repeatedly battling manual control inputs. It will also require additional pilot training and operating manual changes, both of which were called for by pilots unions following the Lion Air crash.

Boeing’s position, endorsed by the FAA, has been that because MCAS is only supposed to trigger in extreme circumstances—high angles of attack and accelerated stalls—that additional pilot training was not necessary. The company has also said that it assumed that based on their existing training on earlier models pilots would recognize the erroneous nose-down commands and hit cutoff switches that would disable the system. This is a standard runaway trim scenario for all aircraft.

“The assumptions in here are incorrect. The human factors were not properly evaluated,” the Times quoted an unnamed FAA safety engineer as saying.

The story also suggests that due to budget cuts the FAA’s certification managers were under increasing pressure to delegate more and more of the safety assessments to Boeing itself. The unprecedented levels of self-certification in the MAX were compounded by the urgency to get the airplane into service because of competitive pressure from Airbus’s new A320neo series. “There wasn’t a complete and proper review of the documents,” the former FAA engineer is quoted as saying. “Review was rushed to reach certain certification dates.”

IF all of this is true (IF), then there is plenty of blame to go around, but unless it is found that the "off switch" for the MCAS was defective, pilot error is still going to be a major factor. The point of flight safety engineering is to eliminate to the degree possible situations where humans have to take unusual, difficult, or unexpected actions to keep the plane in the air. Whether disengaging the MCAS is such an unusual or unexpected action is a matter for pilots of the plane to answer, but it doesn't seem so to me. That isn't a get out of jail free card for Boeing, or the FAA, but given that every pilot on earth has now been reminded of that little switch, even if no changes were made to the existing system I doubt you would see a repeat of this event. Not an argument for not changing it, just an observation.

 

[psneeld]

Doesn't even have to be a switch, could be a CB to disable.


Pulled plenty in my time.

 

[Seevee]

IF all of this is true (IF), then there is plenty of blame to go around, but unless it is found that the "off switch" for the MCAS was defective, pilot error is still going to be a major factor. The point of flight safety engineering is to eliminate to the degree possible situations where humans have to take unusual, difficult, or unexpected actions to keep the plane in the air. Whether disengaging the MCAS is such an unusual or unexpected action is a matter for pilots of the plane to answer, but it doesn't seem so to me. That isn't a get out of jail free card for Boeing, or the FAA, but given that every pilot on earth has now been reminded of that little switch, even if no changes were made to the existing system I doubt you would see a repeat of this event. Not an argument for not changing it, just an observation.

Delfin,

You're right about pilots should be able to handle unexpected/unusual actions but only to the point where they have been trained. If the news is correct, that the pilots where not only NOT trained, and they didn't know this existed, then they should be totally innocent.

While we have had many pilots improvise beyond their training and procedures in the book (Sully, Haines, etc), we can't blame one for not going beyond the norm that is expected.

Agreed that any pilot today that has read the news could most likely survive a MCAS failure.

 

[ssobol]

Doesn't even have to be a switch, could be a CB to disable.

Pulled plenty in my time.

CBs in an airliner cockpit can number in the hundreds and are often located behind the pilots and may even involve moving a seat. With a two man crew, finding the one you want when the airplane is pretty much out of control would be very difficult. A switch that the pilots can reach from their seat is a much better solution.

Certain military planes fly be computer. This is necessary because the design is optimized for certain things. In the B2 it is stealth. In the F-16 it is maneuverability. In both these aircraft, the human pilot cannot react quickly enough to keep the plane flying. If the computers fail, these planes will crash.

In the Airbus family of aircraft, the computer flies the plane. The pilot makes suggestions to the computer. If the computer agrees, the plane will maneuver under computer control within the computer maneuvering limits. This provides some benefits, like not having to pull back on the stick when making turns (like the 737) and automatically holding a bank angle. However, if all the computers fail in an Airbus, the pilots are left flying the plane with only manual stab trim, rudder, and engine thrust.

Because the 737 is basically a design from the 60's, it flies with mechanically controlled hydraulic actuators (i.e. cables). Newer Boeing aircraft are fly-by-wire using more computers.

 

[Delfin]

Delfin,

You're right about pilots should be able to handle unexpected/unusual actions but only to the point where they have been trained. If the news is correct, that the pilots where not only NOT trained, and they didn't know this existed, then they should be totally innocent.

While we have had many pilots improvise beyond their training and procedures in the book (Sully, Haines, etc), we can't blame one for not going beyond the norm that is expected.

Agreed that any pilot toady that has read the news could most likely survive a MCAS failure.

Didn't the existence of, and training for, an auto trim cancellation action exist prior to these? I guess if the pilots haven't been trained, they might not recognize this issue as an action that can be cancelled, but that if the switch exists to kill MCAS, wouldn't a pilot trained or not trained want to know what that little button does? I'm probably over-simplifying....

 

[ssobol]

Didn't the existence of, and training for, an auto trim cancellation action exist prior to these? I guess if the pilots haven't been trained, they might not recognize this issue as an action that can be cancelled, but that if the switch exists to kill MCAS, wouldn't a pilot trained or not trained want to know what that little button does? I'm probably over-simplifying....

That might depend a bit on the initiative of the pilots involved. Some only learn what is actively taught to them (i.e. spoon fed), others are actually interested in how the thing works and spend the time and effort to learn as much as they can about it. Since an airplane works in an environment that will kill you if you mess up, you'd think pilots would want to know as much as possible about their plane and how to operate it.

Before someone points out that the MCAS may not have been adequately explained in the pilot's manual, there are other sources of information about the aircraft systems (e.g. aircraft maintenance manuals).

Sort of like people and cars. Some have an active interest in how the car actually works and others think of it as an appliance. Turn it on and it works, if it doesn't call somebody.