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Old 03-12-2019, 10:48 PM   #21
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Originally Posted by BruceK View Post
What were the Captain`s accrued hours to date of death?
I think I read 8000 hours, but given that he most likely has hands on the yoke (autopilot inhibits the MCAS by design), he's relying on the hapless "passenger" in the right seat to run the memory items and the runaway trim list at a very low altitude.
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Old 03-12-2019, 11:59 PM   #22
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Whoa....probably still more to the story.
But so far from what I have read is the least trained are the issue...no aircraft is perfect even years after hard use.


Uncontrolled flight and the crew doesn't secure the autopilot? Wouldn't let them row my dingy to shore.

Actually, the aircraft were being hand-flown. The autopilot inhibits the MCAS.


The Boeing checklist for an uncommanded pitch change:

Firmly grasp the yoke
Disengage the A/T and A/P
If runaway does not stop...
Stab trim cutout switches to cutout



Pretty much the same for any airplane with electric trim, even my Piper Arrow, as I think about it.


While I have 30 years with the FAA and 10 years as a Professor of Aviation Technology, I don't claim any special knowledge of this airplane, but I have a good network, including someone who is currently flying this airplane with a US Part 121 carrier who provided this insight:


The Lion Air crew had 26 MCAS events. 25 times they did what you'd naturally do--they trimmed in the opposite direction with the yoke trim thumb switches. This stops the MCAS for five seconds. If the conditions which triggered the MCAS are still present (in this case, the bad AoA data) another 10 second MCAS activation will occur. After two or three of these cycles it should become obvious that there is a trim problem and the cutout switches should be used (the A/P must already be off as the A/P suppresses MCAS) For some reason, they never did this.
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Old 03-13-2019, 12:36 AM   #23
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The 737 stab trim cutout switches are not redundant. One switch cuts out the pilot activated trim system, the other cuts out the automatic trim system (mostly from the autopilot). The MCAS system is cut out if the stab trim cutout switches are activated (don't recall which one). The drill mentioned for runway trim (or any uncommanded trim actuation) is to cutout both systems using the switches. If the pilot's have the opportunity, the switches can be reengaged individually to see which system is causing the runway. Once the faulty system is determined, the aircraft can be flown normally using the other one.

In the event that the cutout switches do not stop the trim movement, the pilot can override the system by grabbing the manual trim wheel and holding it. Grabbing the spinning wheel can seem a little tricky, but there is a technique to doing it.

Runway trim events are part of initial and recurrent training.

Unfortunately these days, pilot training is more of rote practice of the aircraft manufacturer's procedures. If it's not on the manufacturer manual most airlines are reluctant to expand or enhance what they get in the aircraft manuals. A big part of this is liability. But it results in pilots that do not have the ability to improvise if things get out of hand and it wasn't in the manual. You'd think that if something happened 26 times in a few minutes, the pilots would have started to catch on to how to handle the problem.
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Old 03-13-2019, 06:44 AM   #24
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"A big part of this is liability. But it results in pilots that do not have the ability to improvise if things get out of hand and it wasn't in the manual."

In the past pilot training was in depth , and after transition most pilots could "build the plane", draw the basic engine, electrical, hydraulic, APU, and air pressure systems from memory.

Today its "switch position" , if moving a switch can not solve the problem ,carry on, as there is nothing you can do about it.

For decades Boeing did not install an AoA , perhaps that was a good idea?

Personally I would choose any Boeing over an Air Bust , as the flight control on Boeings is for pilots , not an automated system.
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Old 03-13-2019, 07:51 AM   #25
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I know zip about flying and planes, but this is sounding like the Korean Air problem - basically inadequately trained pilots who can operate the controls, but who are challenged to actually fly the plane themselves.
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Old 03-13-2019, 09:48 AM   #26
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A lot of aircraft have uncommanded inputs or unusual emergencies during their growth.


The second type USCG helo I flew would sometimes reduce lift to zero while descending under 100 feet while making a approaches to the water at night. Talk about eye openers....but we didn't crash any.


Pilots that fly new aircraft or modded should understand more than the minimum training requirements.
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Old 03-13-2019, 10:33 AM   #27
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Old 03-13-2019, 11:24 AM   #28
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I know zip about flying and planes, but this is sounding like the Korean Air problem - basically inadequately trained pilots who can operate the controls, but who are challenged to actually fly the plane themselves.
https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/...www.cnn.com%2F

Can’t blame pilots if it isn’t in the flight manual.
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Old 03-13-2019, 11:31 AM   #29
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... For decades Boeing did not install an AoA , perhaps that was a good idea?... .
At least on the 737NGs, AOA is an option. The system has it anyway and it can be displayed to the pilot on the PFD. However, it is the airlines not Boeing who choose not to enable it (it is a simple aircraft display option selection). Only a few use it, I believe AA is one.

It would be the same for any Boeing aircraft that uses the Boeing CDS system for the cockpit displays.

FWIW, most business jets have AOA displays and have had them for a long time.
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Old 03-13-2019, 11:41 AM   #30
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Originally Posted by Screaming04 View Post
https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/...www.cnn.com%2F

Can’t blame pilots if it isn’t in the flight manual.
Beginners know the flight manual, real pros progress well beyond.


Look at surviving flight crew actions during unusual events, they relied on knowledge and experience well beyond the flight manual.
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Old 03-13-2019, 11:45 AM   #31
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Originally Posted by ssobol View Post
At least on the 737NGs, AOA is an option. The system has it anyway and it can be displayed to the pilot on the PFD. However, it is the airlines not Boeing who choose not to enable it (it is a simple aircraft display option selection). Only a few use it, I believe AA is one.

It would be the same for any Boeing aircraft that uses the Boeing CDS system for the cockpit displays.

FWIW, most business jets have AOA displays and have had them for a long time.
However, thinking about this further, if the aircraft is flying badly due to a faulty AOA sensor, presenting this faulty information to the pilot probably won't help things much.
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Old 03-13-2019, 12:48 PM   #32
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Originally Posted by Screaming04 View Post
https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/...www.cnn.com%2F

Can’t blame pilots if it isn’t in the flight manual.
That is still false. It was in the flight manual from the beginning, just not called current nomenclature of MCAS. Perhaps read the wiki you posted and note that the Lion Air pilots were unfamiliar with the basic checklists every 737 pilot of expected to know, and that the Lion Air mechanics were replacing sensors the day before the flight. The claim that this is Boeing's responsibility is put forward by lawyers looking for the deepest pocket to go after, and should be given as much credence as one of Michael Avenatti's allegations.
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Old 03-13-2019, 12:52 PM   #33
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Originally Posted by psneeld View Post
A lot of aircraft have uncommanded inputs or unusual emergencies during their growth.


The second type USCG helo I flew would sometimes reduce lift to zero while descending under 100 feet while making a approaches to the water at night. Talk about eye openers....but we didn't crash any.


Pilots that fly new aircraft or modded should understand more than the minimum training requirements.
Or perhaps one way to put it is that each air frame has unique flight characteristics that pilots have to master. My TB-21 could be landed smoothly on short runways. Put me in a Mooney and I'd need 5,000 feet to get it on the ground because I'm not used to the different way that frame handles ground effect. Blaming Mooney if I run off the runway would be unfair.

These aren't Greyhound buses.
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Old 03-13-2019, 01:08 PM   #34
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... Blaming Mooney if I run off the runway would be unfair. ....
But is likely to happen by the pilot (or his/her heirs) or anyone else injured in the resulting accident.
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Old 03-13-2019, 01:28 PM   #35
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But is likely to happen by the pilot (or his/her heirs) or anyone else injured in the resulting accident.
Which is why planes cost 2x what that should.

The most perverse example of this is the new Icon. It is so easy to fly, pilot's, including experienced ones, are tempted to make poor decisions in flight that have cost lives.

https://www.aviationlawmonitor.com/2018/01/articles/general-aviation/family-sues-icon-for-fatal-a5-crash/
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Old 03-13-2019, 01:34 PM   #36
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I cannot believe that the FAA allowed Boeing to certify this aircraft as a modified 737 and not as a new aircraft. The wing was moved several feet to accommodate the new engines changing the flight characteristics and yet they were permitted to avoid the costly full certification flight test program: WHY?

It is now obvious that there is a significant flaw in this design, one that Boeing was aware of, witness the band-aid they used to “fix” the problem and one that they would have been required to address on a more fundamental level had their been a full certification flight test program instead of the truncated one mandated for modifications to certificated designs.

Is this a case of regulatory capture wherein the revolving door allows Boeing to dictate to their regulator, the FAA, what they want and the agency finds a way to make that happen? If not, why is the US practically the only nation that has failed to ground the 737 MAX fleet? Or has the FAA again prioritized the “promote aviation” portion of their mission statement over the safety part.

UPDATE: President overrules FAA and grounds all 737 MAX 6 and 8’s.
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Old 03-13-2019, 02:02 PM   #37
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Maybe the FAA is more on top of it and not "guessing"....
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Old 03-13-2019, 02:08 PM   #38
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Grounded. Enough said.
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Old 03-13-2019, 05:54 PM   #39
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Grounded. Enough said.
Not sure about that. Some posters are adamant the cause is pilot error/lack of pilot training/pilot stupidity and the planes have had the system since 737 inception. I expect they take strong issue with the POTUS decision to ground the aircraft, which he says has airline agreement.Canada fell in line with grounding.
I`m reading the system giving trouble is a "fix" to correct a handling peculiarity of the aircraft which may now be corrected by a further "fix". But if the crashes are due to pilot incompetence, grounding and talk of further "fix" is unnecessary,and Govts.and aviation authorities around the world have got this completely wrong.
Fortunately our forthcoming flights are B787 and A350. Though on the A350 personal items placed on the windowsill can be lost into a gap.
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Old 03-13-2019, 06:23 PM   #40
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Quote:
Some posters are adamant the cause is pilot error/lack of pilot training/pilot stupidity and the planes have had the system since 737 inception.
I'm probably in the group you refer to, though I don't have enough info to be adamant about anything, but:


I am inclined to suspect that we are looking not at "pilot error or stupidity", but at the effect of superimposing 21st Century technology on 19th Century management systems. Strangely, that seems to be what the President was trying to say when he whined about Einstein the Pilot.


Both of these carriers have been on the ICAO "sh*t" list in recent memory for training and management issues. Excerpt below from a longer message from a guy who is in the compliance business:
Boeing regulatory affairs representatives worked with the Indonesian Civil Aviation Authority in regaining FAA International Aviation Safety Assessments (IASA) Category 1 status. Similarly Boeing recently supported Ethiopia in its attempt to maintain a FAA IASA Category 1 rating. In other words both countires failed to meet the very basic ICAO Annex operational and airworthiness standards. And were FAA IASA Cat 2 countries (IAW litle or no aviation safety regulations.)

A few years ago an ICAO Safety Audit of the Ethiopian civil aviation system found in a 141 page report in part, that...

- Ethiopia Civil Aviation Authority has not developed and promulgated operating regulations that are in conformance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 6. In practice, various Annex 6 provisions are being implemented; however, there is no technical directive or regulation requiring such implementation. The Ethiopian regulations do not include, among other requirements, the following:
...
c) flight manuals revisions and parameters of flight data recorders;
d) implementation of a system for providing flight information to operations staff and flight crew;
e) aircraft certification and operating limitations;
f) required training for flight operations officers;
...

- The Flight Operations Division of the ECAA has not developed a formal surveillance inspection programme that includes all the types and frequency of inspections required for proper oversight of air operator certificate (AOC) holders. There is no surveillance of station facilities or oversight of all the designated pilot examiners authorized to perform examinations on behalf of the ECAA. In addition, there is no surveillance over cabin crew instructors and examiners, and no comprehensive surveillance over flight crew and cabin crew duty and rest periods.

-The ECAA has not established a procedure to gather sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a flight crew member has not performed his/her duties in accordance with the prescribed procedures, as personnel licensing inspectors do not review the reports of flight examinations performed by designated pilot examiners.

-The ECAA system for the certification of aviation training organizations, including a system for ensuring the qualification and competency of the instructors in all aviation training
organizations...is not comprehensive and does not conform with the provisions of Annex 1, Appendix 2. In addition, the ECAA has not established an effective surveillance programme to ensure continuing regulatory compliance by approved training organizations.

The message is much longer, but I think this gives the flavor. Add to this the 200 hour "co-pilot", the ground staff who dispatched the airplane at least six times with a failed AOA sensor, and the flightcrew who made the same ineffectual response 25 times, and I understand why FAA was not in a hurry to blame the flight control system.


I am curious about the report of "new evidence" discovered at the Ethiopia site.
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