Boeing 737 MAX

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Here we go again: This whole thread is in hindsight.

And that is where you and I disagree on this entrie thread. You look back in hindsight. I look at the resources available at the time.

Do you remember up until about 20 years ago....the cause of every single aircraft accident?????

Remember????

It was the aircarft impacting the earth!!! Every single accident report had as the cause of the accident: "Aircarft impacting terrain/earth"!!!

What good does that do for us looking to learn from the mistakes that were made. That is where you are in all of this....looking back in hindsight. Aircraft impacting the terrain... Screw hindsight. Put yourself in their position with the resources they had available at that time and then talk to me. That is where the learning takes place. Not looking down your nose in hindsight.
 
And that is where you and I disagree on this entrie thread. You look back in hindsight. I look at the resources available at the time. ...................Screw hindsight. Put yourself in their position with the resources they had available at that time and then talk to me. That is where the learning takes place. Not looking down your nose in hindsight.
Baker, you nailed it again. How many times will it take?
"None so blind as those who will not see"
 
Are there air speed restrictions on doing that?

And of course it presumes the pilots understand the operation of MCAS and know that will disable it.

Overspeeding the flaps is going to do a whole lot less damage than impacting terrain.

It would also put the electric trim in high speed mode which should help get the trim back where it belongs quicker.
 
Here we go again: This whole thread is in hindsight.
Nowhere did I reference a procedure or bulletin advising to lower flaps, you are reading into stuff that is not there: Again: It is not procedure, nor did I say it was, jeez..

Somebody was asking how to deactivate or turn of the MCAS system:
The answer is flaps or autopilot. (It has already been mentioned before several times, but maybe some folks did not read the whole thread. Flaps or Autopilot, it is a fact, NOT a procedure, jeez again :facepalm:)


Wow, chill.


We now all know that engaging AP or applying flaps disables MCAS. But that's now. So those are great candidates for new procedures, and improved training on the operation of MCAS. But Baker's point is that neither of these facts were widely known or communicated, so there is no reason to think the pilots knew about either of these remedies - or perhaps they would have tried them, and perhaps they would have all survived. The published and trained remedy was trim cutout, and that's what they did. Your own posted bulletin shows this, i.e. no reference to flaps or AP as alternate methods of overriding uncommanded trim down.



So yes, in this discussion it's hard to distinguish whether one's comments are from the perspective of what the pilots knew at the time, or what we know now. What they knew then is great for analysis. What we know now helps sort our remedial actions and improvements.


As an example, my earlier comments about things the pilots could have done differently was looking at future procedures with the benefit of what we know now. It wasn't meant to scold or blame the pilots. We could all be clearer about this. I sure wasn't, and some took it as throwing the pilots under the bus.
 
Looking back at the pilot's actions, and understanding what they knew at the time about the aircraft and it's operational behavior, it seems they did everything right, except for one thing. They lost track of air speed. They remained at near full power the whole time, and speed got way ahead of them, and made it harder and harder to control the plane with the tools available.


Should they have throttled back? I realize that when the shirt's hitting the fan, it's easy to lose track of the things that are working, like the engines. You become hyper focused on the problem at hand.


And to be clear, I'm not trying to blame, just trying to analyze.
 
Overspeeding the flaps is going to do a whole lot less damage than impacting terrain.

It would also put the electric trim in high speed mode which should help get the trim back where it belongs quicker.


So applying flaps or getting AP activated are two additional tools available to lockout MCAS, yet retain electric trim control. There is no reason either of these were known to the pilots at the time, but leveraging what we know now, either of these could have helped. Right?


Interestingly, activating AP is taking trim control away from one automation device and handing it over to another. So if you think automation is failing because of bad input sensors or whatever, switching to another automation device may not be your first choice. And as we have learned, the plane needs to be trim and stable for the AP to accept control anyway, so might not be possible to engage if you are playing tug of war with MCAS.
 
IMO, this discussion is not about solving the problem and providing a solution that all pilots should use whenever the MCAS acts up. It is a discussion on a particular aircraft system, a particular aircraft, and speculation on what might have been done to resolve the issue. It is an intellectual exercise and AFAIK, no one has tasked this forum with developing a solution to the problem.

Finally, if the plane is heading towards the ground and the procedure isn't working, it might be time to try something else.
 
Geeze,

After this discussion, I'm never flying again. Heck, I'm now afraid to even drive to the airport.... <g>


However, a few things we have clearly learned......

The pilots are NOT the blame for this accident. They weren't trained for this situation and didn't have the knowledge of even the existence of the MCAS, so how the heck could they fight it?

Another thing..... when faced with a deadly situation and nothing is working, the "helmet fire" mentality rapidly comes in. In some cases, someone SO focused could have their arm cut off and they would never know it.

We all have a different way of dealing with helmet fires, and the absolutely BEST way is to be trained to avoid them. Had the pilots attended a simulator session where this same scenario was played out, with the solution at hand, this would have been a minor inconvenience and a log book write up.

Now, there really are a few exceptional people that can really think outside the box, and probably figure this one out as it unfolds, but the average airline pilot does not have the training and the mental capacity to do this.

One solution I'd like to see is more basic stick and rudder training and the ability to shut down EVERYTHING in the plane and fly needle ball and airspeed, which has been proven to work since the Wright Brothers.
 
And that is where you and I disagree on this entrie thread. You look back in hindsight. I look at the resources available at the time.

Do you remember up until about 20 years ago....the cause of every single aircraft accident?????

Remember????

It was the aircarft impacting the earth!!! Every single accident report had as the cause of the accident: "Aircarft impacting terrain/earth"!!!

What good does that do for us looking to learn from the mistakes that were made. That is where you are in all of this....looking back in hindsight. Aircraft impacting the terrain... Screw hindsight. Put yourself in their position with the resources they had available at that time and then talk to me. That is where the learning takes place. Not looking down your nose in hindsight.

I look at all these accidents to learn from them, not looking down my nose in hindsight :rolleyes:

As for “aircraft impacting earth”, no idea where that came from, your kind of an accident report?
I am looking for “Probable Cause” and there is more to that than hitting the ground at high speed.
Trying to learn something from every accident hence I study them i detail.
I could pick up the phone tomorrow and get a job as a 737 MAX Captain for your Airline, naturally I want to know what the hell happened in these accidents.
(Doubt I will go back, but I have the option, hence I am interested.)
As I have said earlier: I am hoping to do better in an emergency, but you never know, gaining detailed information and looking at every “what if this” and “what if that” may prepare every pilot for a big surprise, instead of being overwhelmed by bells and whistles going haywire.
Both these MAX airplanes that crashed were sick, but not crippled, they were flyable.
That is my whole point.
 
. The pilots are NOT the blame for this accident. They weren't trained for this situation and didn't have the knowledge of even the existence of the MCAS, so how the heck could they fight it?

Nobody has been “blaming” the pilots, but the information on the high profile Lion Air accident 5 months prior was communicated to Ethiopian Airlines.
Perhaps they forgot to inform their MAX pilots of the details and perhaps they forgot to incorporate the details in the training and the recurrent program?
If so, somebody did not do their job and should be held responsible.
 
. So applying flaps or getting AP activated are two additional tools available to lockout MCAS, yet retain electric trim control. There is no reason either of these were known to the pilots at the time, but leveraging what we know now, either of these could have helped. Right?

Yes, flaps and autopilot will nullify the big bad wolf MCAS, but there may be a third option: Applying Electric Trim the opposite direction. (MCAS will always trim nose down to un-load the wing and “prevent” a stall.)
The above Boeing bulletin mentions opposite trim, but MCAS will go active again in 5 seconds, time to shut off the Stab Trim Cutout switches then.
I seem to remember some older airplanes with a “stick pusher”, T-tail planes like the DC-9 and perhaps some other types: If you got close to a stall, the stick would push the elevator down (and nose down) same as The MCAS.
Never flew the 9, don’t know if they relied on a singe sensor or not, but seem to remember a DC-9 Crash due to a false stall warning on rotation, possible SAS airlines. Also seem to remember a TWA 1011 crash at JFK due to a false stall warning.
History tends to repeat itself..:rolleyes:
 
LN...I am assuming you have been in this business for awhile??? "Impact with the terrain" used to be the cause of every single crash....per the NTSB...up until about 20 years ago. It really was not that helpful of a cause.....granted the added "probable causes" which were really the cause...
 
LN...I am assuming you have been in this business for awhile??? "Impact with the terrain" used to be the cause of every single crash....per the NTSB...up until about 20 years ago. It really was not that helpful of a cause.....granted the added "probable causes" which were really the cause...

Been in the business for a while, flew 37 years with a Commercial Pilots License, and an ATP. Started this sport flying bush planes in Alaska, including hauling fish of the beaches with a DC-3. No autopilot or autosh!t going on, just a good old hand flying airplane. Also Twin Otters and other basic craft. Had over 5000 hours before I climbed into a jet. Guess I am a late bloomer, or lucky to learn the hard way.
Flew Captain on B-747s for 8 years as well, including all over Africa, Russia, China and South America between the mountains with heavy cargo and primitive ATC as well as shitty maintenance. Did my best to survive and lucky to be sitting in my Florida back yard drinking beer and tinkering with my boat.
Not “blaming” these poor Ethiopian pilots, they were overwhelmed, just saying the airplane was perfectly flyable if somebody would pull the power back, or do a few other things. (But can’t say that)
I will leave it at that..:facepalm:
 
Nobody has been “blaming” the pilots, but the information on the high profile Lion Air accident 5 months prior was communicated to Ethiopian Airlines.
Perhaps they forgot to inform their MAX pilots of the details and perhaps they forgot to incorporate the details in the training and the recurrent program?
If so, somebody did not do their job and should be held responsible.

LN,

Read back thru the thread, there's been a few referenced to blaming the pilots.
 
Been in the business for a while, flew 37 years with a Commercial Pilots License, and an ATP. Started this sport flying bush planes in Alaska, including hauling fish of the beaches with a DC-3. No autopilot or autosh!t going on, just a good old hand flying airplane. Also Twin Otters and other basic craft. Had over 5000 hours before I climbed into a jet. Guess I am a late bloomer, or lucky to learn the hard way.
Flew Captain on B-747s for 8 years as well, including all over Africa, Russia, China and South America between the mountains with heavy cargo and primitive ATC as well as shitty maintenance. Did my best to survive and lucky to be sitting in my Florida back yard drinking beer and tinkering with my boat.
Not “blaming” these poor Ethiopian pilots, they were overwhelmed, just saying the airplane was perfectly flyable if somebody would pull the power back, or do a few other things. (But can’t say that)
I will leave it at that..:face palm:


Did you fly for Connie?

And where in Florida, you could be my neighbor? (I'm in St. Pete)
 
. Did you fly for Connie?

And where in Florida, you could be my neighbor? (I'm in St. Pete)

No, never flew for Connie.
Evergreen, Tower Air, Kuwait Airways and Tradewinds Airlines. (Those are just my 747 gigs)
Worked for a bunch of other firms as well, including the smallest and the biggest airline in the world and bush operators in Alaska and the Caribbean.
(Lived on a sailboat in the islands and when one company went tits up, I sailed to the next island, put the anchor down and rowed to shore with a resume in my pocket, good old days)
 
. Read back thru the thread, there's been a few referenced to blaming the pilots.

I was talking about me, as in third person.
I did not blame them, just saying the airplane was not 100% crippled, flyable for sure. Not sure why folks are arguing that point..
 
I was talking about me, as in third person.
I did not blame them, just saying the airplane was not 100% crippled, flyable for sure. Not sure why folks are arguing that point..

I don't believe anyone accuse you of blaming the pilots. However, the plane "may" have been flyable with the information we know today, but may not have been flyable with the information the pilots had at the time. There's LOTS of crashes with crippled planes that "may have flown to safety" if the crew knew more about the plane and the situation.

I can't blame a pilot if his training hasn't provided for a scenario that will bring the plane down.
 
I could pick up the phone tomorrow and get a job as a 737 MAX Captain for your Airline...

If you don't already work for my airline(with the seniority to hold captain), then that is not the way it works. We don't hire "street captains".

And no one is arguing that the airplane was flyable. But stating so just doesn't add much to the discussion. It is an important factor obviously. We are here to discuss why these guys crashed(a flyable airplane).
 
. If you don't already work for my airline(with the seniority to hold captain), then that is not the way it works. We don't hire "street captains".

No ****, but it looks like we work for the same firm.
 
. We are here to discuss why these guys crashed(a flyable airplane).

Yes, tried to make that point many times.
 
I've read enough that this non-aviator mind seems to have a decent grasp on what happened on both. Not why the AOA went south, but how the pilots failed to manage the result.

After the Indonesia event, it seems like the peculiarity of the MCAS was put out to all Max owners. So why did the Ethiopians not get the message?

It seems rather simple to work around the MCAS, but in both cases mistakes were made. Seems some decent training would cover that.

So why is the fleet still grounded? Is there more to this than there seems? Must be?

Not trying to give Boeing a pass on this, as the system does seem to be flawed. But there must be more going on here.
 
After the Indonesia event, it seems like the peculiarity of the MCAS was put out to all Max owners. So why did the Ethiopians not get the message?

They did, loud and clear.
Did they pay attention?
 
....After the Indonesia event, it seems like the peculiarity of the MCAS was put out to all Max owners. So why did the Ethiopians not get the message?

It seems rather simple to work around the MCAS, but in both cases mistakes were made. Seems to me decent training would cover that.

So why is the fleet still grounded?
Is there more to this than there seems? Must be?

Not trying to give Boeing a pass on this, as the system does seem to be flawed. But there must be more going on here.
And that`s the question. Why, if the cause, at least for crash 2, is the asserted pilot error, are the planes not back in the air? Safely earning $ for the operators, and redeeming Boeing`s reputation and stock price?
Seems to me it was originally defective sensor meets secret MCAS. But what now?
 
So why is the fleet still grounded? Is there more to this than there seems? Must be?

Not trying to give Boeing a pass on this, as the system does seem to be flawed. But there must be more going on here.

The system needs to be fixed. There needs to be another input to MCAS as well as limit the authority of it.
 
"Seems to me it was originally defective sensor meets secret MCAS. But what now?"

By now every FLUF driver world wide has read all the good , bad , and internet garbage concerning the problem.

I would assume all have memorized procedures , and which order to use them.

The hassle is when there is a crash , or a scratch in a tail light , the aircraft goes on a scale and that weight of paperwork is required to be produced .
 
The system needs to be fixed. There needs to be another input to MCAS as well as limit the authority of it.

I agree that it needs to be fixed. What that fix entails will be left to the experts (and I am not one!).

The question I have now is why the fleet remains grounded. I guess the answer to that exists in the political realm as this thing has blown up so huge. And that is explainable considering the large loss of life.

I used to work in this capacity in another industry and retain a lot of curiosity about such matters. A typical incident response would be, once the causes were understood, if training could resolve it, crews would get trained and then the hardware fixes would be done on a schedule. And then the machinery would be put back into service. But we never killed anyone, either. Certainly is a big difference there.

I think the fault lies with the pilots actions. Not fault with the pilots in the sense that they had intent to cause an incident, or were sloppy, (I'm sure they did not want this to happen!), but somehow their companies had them operating the AC's without them knowing how to recover from this. Especially bad in the second incident where the cause of the first was at least mostly understood.

It seems the MCAS was sort of "quietly" introduced to counter some Max handling differences that were not unsafe in themselves, but different enough from previous generations that it could have caused other rules to be applied. So some fault lies with the structure of the rules, and some for Boeing trying to sneak around them.

Amazing how automated safety systems can so easily cause unintended problems. Just look at the new automobiles!!
 
Ski,

Good points.

And why this is taking so long is probably related to the severity of this issue, which has killed a bunch of folks in two accidents and is now the focus of the FAA, NTSB, Boeing and probably several others.

The solution will be scrutinized and washed over and over again. If the fix isn't perfect and extremely well done, heads will roll, and no one wants to loose their head.

So, I'm betting, by the time this is fixed, it will most likely be the best fix that aviation has ever seen. And then the powers to be will have to wipe the egg from their face and restore public confidence in the Boeing product, which will take time, and after a lot of dollars are lost.

I'm a little disappointed that Boeing produced such an automated product and left the pilots out of the equation. That's not like them. They have produced a lot of automated products, but have always included the crew.

And this won't be the last issue or accident with automation. Things will fail again, but hope that we can have "safe" failures where the fix is a minor airworthiness directive inconvenience and we don't have to loose hulls to find out about them.
 
Perhaps the mother of all dumb questions after 330 posts: could the MCAS have not simply have been turned off before takeoff and the plane flown manually? Boeing knew there was a problem, why not issue that directive?

Or, are either the planes or pilots, incapable of flying by hand?
 
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