Navy Destroyer tee boned by a Freighter?

The friendliest place on the web for anyone who enjoys boating.
If you have answers, please help by responding to the unanswered posts.
Back to catalinajack’s comment (#416) – I don’t think many readers without Navy experience can fully appreciate the brass cojones of that boatswain's mate. Boatswain's Mate of the Watch (BMOW) is a junior watchstation. Likely, our BMOW was a pretty junior guy (used generically, maybe a gal). Probably the rank equivalent of an Army PFC or corporal.

Speaking as a former raghat (enlisted) sailor, the mental leap that this sailor had to make to take this action is phenomenal. The USN surface fleet is an extremely hierarchical environment and it’s in your face every minute of every day. Example: as a mid-grade career enlisted submarine sailor (PO1) temporarily assigned to an aircraft carrier, I got lost (easy to do), and finally figured a route from where I was to where I was going. Unbeknownst to me, my course took me through a passageway in “Officer’s Country” – officers staterooms. When discovered, I received a basic training level public ass chewing for daring to violate sacred space by my transient presence.

In that context, this guy assesses the situation, looks at the response of 2 or 3 layers of management over him, and decides to take independent action to attempt to avert disaster. Although too little and too late, he/she ought to get a spot meritorious promotion and a medal. Of course, that won’t happen because every man-jack on that bridge and in the CIC will have a tarnished record following them as long as they’re in the USN. It’s the Navy way.

If it seems like I’m ragging on the USN – I am, as a family member. I spent 26 years there. Must have liked it.
 
:iagree: I did 22 years, mostly old worn out destroyers, one FF super sub hunter and a knew CG.
Looks like the new Navy forgot what the old Navy new. They mention the crew and ships being over used because they are forward deployed. How about “ haze grey and underway” for seven months standing 4 on and 8 off watch rotation plus putting in a regular 8hour work day. Also in my rating 10-12 year of “arduous sea duty” before a 2 year shore duty break.
I would bet the chain of command and getting the word out on that ship stunk. Poor communication = un-safe operations.
 
Last edited:
In my time on destroyers, late 60s, the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch would have been a 2nd or 3rd class petty officer (E-4 or 5). With no computers like today, all ship contacts were plotted manually for closest point of approach (CPA). A ship within 5 miles would have been watched. A ship within a couple miles would have been a big deal.
In a task force, normal steaming, destroyers were 1-2 nautical miles apart except for a plane guard destroyer that would be a mile astern of the carrier. So a non navy ship within that distance wouldn't happen.
At that time there were 3 lookouts besides the bridge crew. One dedicated to the stern view. Also, CIC (radar room) duplicated all plots and contacts. A ship within a few 100 yards would have them going ballistic. At the least there would have been a senior chief radarman coming to the bridge and raising hell.
The exception was Soviet "fishing" trawlers. Gathering intelligence, they were common during refueling and air operations, but operated in a professional way.
 
If that kid really did grab the helm he has the biggest set of balls in the Navy. When did they stop rotating watch standers? Guess the new Navy is nothing like my Navy was.

Bluenose 1984
Golden Shellback 1990
Sailor for life
 
Last edited:
Back to catalinajack’s comment (#416) – I don’t think many readers without Navy experience can fully appreciate the brass cojones of that boatswain's mate. Boatswain's Mate of the Watch (BMOW) is a junior watchstation. Likely, our BMOW was a pretty junior guy (used generically, maybe a gal). Probably the rank equivalent of an Army PFC or corporal.

Speaking as a former raghat (enlisted) sailor, the mental leap that this sailor had to make to take this action is phenomenal. The USN surface fleet is an extremely hierarchical environment and it’s in your face every minute of every day. Example: as a mid-grade career enlisted submarine sailor (PO1) temporarily assigned to an aircraft carrier, I got lost (easy to do), and finally figured a route from where I was to where I was going. Unbeknownst to me, my course took me through a passageway in “Officer’s Country” – officers staterooms. When discovered, I received a basic training level public ass chewing for daring to violate sacred space by my transient presence.

In that context, this guy assesses the situation, looks at the response of 2 or 3 layers of management over him, and decides to take independent action to attempt to avert disaster. Although too little and too late, he/she ought to get a spot meritorious promotion and a medal. Of course, that won’t happen because every man-jack on that bridge and in the CIC will have a tarnished record following them as long as they’re in the USN. It’s the Navy way.

If it seems like I’m ragging on the USN – I am, as a family member. I spent 26 years there. Must have liked it.
Yup, that BM would have been hailed a hero had the collision been avoided. And, yes, that did take a huge amount of courage. My son is a CPO (CTT). His watch is always in the CIC. His job is to launch defensive measures in the case of an incoming anti-ship missile. The enlisted sailor on the radar console has the authority to launch counter- measures on his own authority if need be. That sailor could be a PO3 which is an amazing amount of responsibility for a 19yo. Where do we find such fine young men? Anyway, I hope that BM's career is not in the toilet cuz of incompetent superior officers.
 
OK. upfront disclaimer. I have never served in the military, I am grateful for the men and women who do, and just wanted to play devil's advocate for a minute and offer an opposing view.

I agree that the kid had a great deal of courage and did the right thing, but isn't there a reason that enlisted men are constantly reminded of their subservience to officers ? I think a lot of things that are necessary during war time seem un reasonable during peace time, but you can't have different rules, and as much good as the Armed Forces do around the world, their main function is to perform during war. Admirals, Generals or whatever make decisions that we need to take that hill, or secure that beach....and if they need 500 men at the top of the hill, they send 1500 up there knowing that 2/3 will not make it. I think the blind obedience culture during peace time has been created specifically so that when someone says "Charge"!, the infantry doesn't say: "hmmmm.....do we really need this hill......do I consider this an acceptable risk"?

What this kid did on the bridge was absolutely the right thing to do, in this case. But...if independent thought and questioning orders is encouraged, there could be a significant downside to it. It would be great to say "Only question your commanding officer when its appropriate"....but that creates a lot of grey area and think the military likes things to be pretty black and white as far as orders go. Obviously there is a downside to soldiers that are totally robotic, but I think there is also a downside to encouraging subordinates to question their superiors. Ideally, all orders will be fair, just and necessary, but no one is perfect and we ask an awful lot of our servicemen and women, and mistakes will be made. Its inevitable.

Just something to think about....
 
I served during Vietnam on destroyers and patrol boats. When an junior, officer or enlisted, takes over, and he's right, usually he doesn't get in trouble, but no reward. If he's wrong it's real bad. Sometimes it's real bad if he's right.
When I went in the navy I already had sea time in ships, tugs and lots of boats. Most people have no experience. While officers get training and schooling, they don't get a lot of hands on experience. It depends on the ship they go to and the captain. Some captains do all the critical ship handling. Some give junior officers lots of opportunities to handle the ship. But I have seen captains that were scary ship handlers, too.
 
OK.
...

Just something to think about....

Benthic,

A normal false assumption that many people make.
But in fact, my experience is the opposite is true. And in fact, though i got out of the USAF because I thought it was inefficient and bureaucratic, I was young and dumb.

Turned out in many ways, it was far more "democratic" than almost all the places i worked afterward for the next 20 years.

That sense of team work, is what has made rhe U.S. military so effective.
And stands in marked contrast to the Germans of WW2, who followed orders that were at best nonsensical.

Think of it this way, when the order is given to charge up that hill, unless your willing to immediately shoot those that don't (as the Russians and German SS did) then it's about your leadership.

One of the first things we were taught in Officer Training School was that no one was charging up that hill to die just because you said so.
A good officer, good leadership, builds a team that works together for a common goal (e.g. that hill). That also means working closely with you senior enlisted people.

These two Navy ships had COs that clearly did NOT do that.

These two ships seem to have no communication from top to bottom.

I'm sure there are many close calls we never hear about. We don't hear about them because on those boats, someone, probably some senior nco (i don't know USN titles) made a call to the CO to get his ass out of bed, knowing he wouldn't be chewed out if it came to nothing.
The Fitzgerald was in contract for 30 minutes before collision.
 
I think it's worth noting at this point that if, in fact, it was the BMOW and not another perhaps more senior watchstander, I've heard told of a QMC QMOW who took charge as it fell apart.

The BMOW was responsible for the lookouts, a primary responsibility, they were not where they were supposed to be; the helm either missed or disobeyed an order three minutes prior to the collision to maintain speed and come left, they are also the responsibility of the BMOW.

So it kind of depends exactly who did what and when. If the BMOW took the helm, probably the right thing based of the trickle of info we have.

The BMOW may well have been a qualified Master Helmsman, used for underway replenishment and other close alongside evolutions. He or she, may have been qualified as Junior officer of the watch or possibly even deck, though I'd guess that's stretching it a bit. Usually any senior enlisted getting that qualification signed off are in need of a plus up to make CPO. OS, QM, BM, often the topside operational types with tough career fields.

So if the BMOW took the helm, that might make perfect sense, if he took the deck, he or she was likely well out of their wheel house. In my opinion.

While it may seem severe, I'm not far from advocating courts martials for those responsible. All the way down to the helm and the CIC watchstanders.
 
Great point Richard (Wxx3)...

Benthic2

It has shown through our military history that our NCOs were taught to think on their feet and adapt. It has worked so far.

The military in situations that require various inputs from everyone involved goes through some kind of "crew, cockpit or bridge coordination" training were input is encouraged and managed in usable and high level, high pressure situations.

Does it work on everyone and every situation? Heck no....

Plus the military works best when the higher ranking guys are good at what they do. Troops respond well then they respect, not love you, and also the other way around. Plenty of times a well meaning copilot said they were uncomfortable during a stressful rescue that wasnt textbook. I listened, but ultimately to get the job done, the copilot had to be reminded why the military puts certain people in charge, because of experience and certifications.

In my last 2 years at headquarters, I was still flying, but at a reduced certification as I couldnt keep all my quals up. So when I flew, often the pilot in command was way junior to me and I had to obey his direction. It was hard to not try to be in charge, but the training shows that attitude is just counterproductive.

This is where crew coordination works best. When the experience is with the guy who isnt in charge. Careful communication can make the same team work as well even if roles were reversed ans in normal operations.

In the case of these bridge crews, I have no idea where the failures were. Even a junior guy after a dozen or twovtransits into and out of busy shipping areas kniws when something isnt right. So where this coordination broke down, even before one guy jumped authority, I would love to know.
 
Last edited:
I have no military background. I think in some situations the military could benefit from some civilians assisting and looking at things, but not those who already do military consulting, those from totally opposite arenas.

In business I've seen the value sometimes of hiring new persons with totally different experiences. While promoting from within has always been something I've tried to do, if you only get knowledge from within your own organization, you might miss out on some very valuable things.

Now to rigidity vs some flexibility, rank vs team, fixed rules vs thinking. I think there are three ways an enterprise can go.

One direction is extremely rigid. Everything by rank, all by orders, never break from the rules. In new hires, at entry levels, that can often be beneficial. If I have a security guard at a gate or guard house, I don't want him to start making judgement calls. I don't care if the owner, who he's never met, of the business shows up and demands entry. However, ultimately suppressing thinking leads to many bad decisions and it leads to failure to recognize the uniqueness about a situation. As a leader, if I'm about to do something stupid, I hope someone working for me will point it out and stop me and if I miss something, I hope someone else will jump in. I've seen some remarkable results when circumstances have called for someone to step beyond their position.

The opposite direction is the Maverick mentality. Sometimes it's entrepreneurship at it's best. It's every one taking ownership. It's do whatever you think needs doing without checking with anyone. And it can lead to total chaos and usually does over time. It's anarchy. It sounds great at first, but in the end it turns on itself.

Then there is the third type of organization. It is disciplined and has a structured hierarchy, with logical reporting relationships and well defined responsibilities. Everyone knows their job requirements and the rules they're expected to follow. Yet, they also know there are times to step up, to go a bit outside the box, to do what must be done. They quickly report what they're doing or just did to the right person or persons. They know that even if they screw up we'll take that chance above having them do nothing. They put our fires when necessary. I remember once early in my career, a boiler caught fire and was destroyed in one of our plants in eastern NC. I reported to the CFO and the CEO and CFO were on a flight to London. I ordered a new boiler, well beyond my approval level and got it on a truck that day. When they landed, I told them of the fire and the order and they thanked me and I told them the plant would be back in operation Monday afternoon. Now, I was in an organization that I knew he would want me to do that. I knew I should step in. I cultivated that in those who worked for me. I'd rather risk Errors of Commission than have Errors of Omission. The young man on the ship couldn't know what he was doing was guaranteed to be right, but he did know that doing nothing would be wrong. That's what any organization needs. Initiative is to be respected.

Now, as I said, I have no military experience. However, I do believe that like any other organizations the military can operate best as the third type of organization. The level or rigidity does vary by what is being done. Certainly peaceful maneuvers are less rigid than combat situations. However, even in a combat situation where a Maverick might get people killed, a person who just steps up a bit as a situation seems to require might save lives. I would venture to say that many heroes have not "followed the book." They saw their fellow soldier in danger and did what they felt they must to save them. Now, sometimes that has resulted in their own loss of life. You teach people to use good judgement. You give them rules and you have rank. However, you know there are times that what is covered in the book, the rules they've memorized and mastered, just don't account for a situation.

The best military leaders, just like civilian leaders, don't lead others through force but do so through knowledge and experience and earning the respect of those under them. They are followed because they have earned it.

I applaud the man who stepped up in this situation. It didn't work out as he hoped, but had he not done so might have been worse. Even more importantly, he doesn't have to live with "I saw it happening and thought I might be able to stop it, but I didn't try, I stood and watched." I'd want him on my team and I sure wouldn't want to go into battle with the guy who stood and watched.
 
In the case of these bridge crews, I have no idea where the failures were. Even a junior guy after a dozen or twovtransits into and out of busy shipping areas kniws when something isnt right. So where this coordination broke down, even before one guy jumped authority, I would love to know.

Yes, I'm far more concerned with knowing about the people who didn't do their jobs, than the one guy how jumped authority to try.
 
As I mentioned, if the Boatswain mate of the watch did take the helm late in the action it cannot be forgotten that several watch standers under his supervision failed to do their jobs or even to be in the appointed place of duty, to whit- the starboard side of the ship....

As it's been discussed it takes a long series of significant failures to line up the holes for a mishap to occur. In my opinion the BMOW and the ability to properly supervise watch-standers was one of those significant failures that should not be overlooked.
 
For those with military experience...especially in a leadership capacity....how would you feel if this guy was being put under you ? Would you think: a) "here's a guy who steps up and does what's necessary", or b) "here's a guy who's hard to manage and wants my job" ?
 
For those with military experience...especially in a leadership capacity....how would you feel if this guy was being put under you ? Would you think: a) "here's a guy who steps up and does what's necessary", or b) "here's a guy who's hard to manage and wants my job" ?

Bad luck can happen to anyone.
This was not that.

A good leader trains the entire crew, be it 2 or 2,000, to do just that. a)

But there are a lot of bad leaders out there. This was not an instant problem. The had 30 minutes to fix it or not.
No body even thought to get the CO. That in itself says all you need to know.
that's what happens under b)
 
While the actions of the BMOW prior to taking the helm would not have been able to cause the mishap, they sure could have prevented it.

Also taking the helm is not the same as taking the deck. Taking the helm is actually steering the ship in accordance with the orders from either the conning officer, the officer of the deck if they have taken the conn, the co or xo also if they have taken the con or the deck.

It's all logged and critical to the safe maneuvering of the ship. The entire team needs to know who has the conn to know who's orders to follow. It sure sounds like it was confused in this case, or the watch-standers were not following orders to the helm. Both significant problems exacerbated by speed, darkness, and complacency.
 
For those with military experience...especially in a leadership capacity....how would you feel if this guy was being put under you ? Would you think: a) "here's a guy who steps up and does what's necessary", or b) "here's a guy who's hard to manage and wants my job" ?

No good leader would venture an opinion on this one action without tons more info.

Captains have to sleep sometime. Taking a ship in and out of port or along a busy shipping lane isnt past the experience level of several junior to him and some of the experienced senior enlisted.

If the Captain was tired and judgement affected, would anything different happened? Maybe, maybe not.

More failures occurred than just supervision from one or two people.
 
More failures occurred than just supervision from one or two people.

Jackpot winner. It reflects a systemic problem. You don't correct it just by replacing one or two people. You've got to figure out everything that created the situation from training to management to methods.
 
Resonates Mr. BandB's comments from 23 months ago

"You've got to figure out everything that created the situation from training to management to methods."

https://www.maritime-executive.com/...-authority-and-accountability-to-the-u-s-navy

bb

They just need the basics of well run businesses. They are not that today. Not placing the blame because everyone needs to share in it, accept responsibility, and think forward and make improvements.

Unfortunately, I'm afraid we'll hear all the reasons they can't and continue to see finger pointing and blame but without solutions.
 
They just need the basics of well run businesses. They are not that today. Not placing the blame because everyone needs to share in it, accept responsibility, and think forward and make improvements.

Unfortunately, I'm afraid we'll hear all the reasons they can't and continue to see finger pointing and blame but without solutions.

Pfft, very little the government does works well when operated as a business. While it's true that there are parallels and processes/methods that would be more usefully applied, the failure of the analogy is purpose of mission. For a 'well run business' that's profit. Which conflicts quite often with the longer mission goals of a government department. Cost effectiveness != profit. I'll agree that better management and cost-effectiveness are important to government departments, but that's not the same as a profit-making enterprise.
 
Management is what destroyed the military between the 80's and 90's.


Ask any Master Chief or Gunny from that time.


Leadership is what is needed....and I don't see a lot of that in business either....well humanity for that matter.


Being under a microscope and being fired or disciplined for every mistake has taken it's toll. Leaders no matter how instinctive from birth still need learning and shaping from mistakes. Nowadays....make a command decision? Not happening.... every little thing is bounced up the chain of command because of instant communications and battlefields are managed by earpiece. While it may still win wars....real leadership just doesn't blossom. Oh there are true heroes out there, forged under fire, just not enough or unfortunately all too often, get squashed by "management".



So has replacing the "good deals" of the military with money...too much mercenary thinking versus true pride and honor.
 
Last edited:
Well said, psneeld. As a mustang in that period I couldn't agree more. The time of "Navy Rights and Responsibilities" mandatory indoctrination of LPOs, CPOs, and JOs. It's not what you say or do in supervising subordinates - it's how the subordinate perceives it. Rot from the very top. Social engineering has no place in a military organization.

The same period as the Iowa turret explosion due to a "homosexual affair" - NOT.

Wasn't the Fitzgerald, but the McCain where the lead BMC was busted by courtmartial for the incident. Sacrificial lamb. Not the design engineers, human systems integration testers, Naval Education and Training Command representatives, or the technical warrant holders. See: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/september/uss-john-s-mccains-chief-not-blame .
 
Management is what destroyed the military between the 80's and 90's.

Ask any Master Chief or Gunny from that time.

Leadership is what is needed....and I don't see a lot of that in business either....well humanity for that matter.

Being under a microscope and being fired or disciplined for every mistake has taken it's toll. Leaders no matter how instinctive from birth still need learning and shaping from mistakes. Nowadays....make a command decision? Not happening.... every little thing is bounced up the chain of command because of instant communications and battlefields are managed by earpiece. While it may still win wars....real leadership just doesn't blossom. Oh there are true heroes out there, forged under fire, just not enough or unfortunately all too often, get squashed by "management".

So has replacing the "good deals" of the military with money...too much mercenary thinking versus true pride and honor.

And management doesn't even win wars.
And good leaders get culled from the crowd, seldom making it past O-3 or 0-4.
 
Well said, psneeld. As a mustang in that period I couldn't agree more. The time of "Navy Rights and Responsibilities" mandatory indoctrination of LPOs, CPOs, and JOs. It's not what you say or do in supervising subordinates - it's how the subordinate perceives it. Rot from the very top. Social engineering has no place in a military organization.

The same period as the Iowa turret explosion due to a "homosexual affair" - NOT.

Wasn't the Fitzgerald, but the McCain where the lead BMC was busted by courtmartial for the incident. Sacrificial lamb. Not the design engineers, human systems integration testers, Naval Education and Training Command representatives, or the technical warrant holders. See: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/september/uss-john-s-mccains-chief-not-blame .

Not to get too into far into it, but the article notes while there are system integration problems, he ran 2, count em 2, loss of steering drills in a year. "He should have performed more steering-loss drills for his junior sailors than the two he ran in the course of a year. He should have tested his sailors on the IBNS." Gee, ya think?

Not only should there have been no qualified helmsmen, there should have been no qualified Conning Officers, JOOD's, OOD's, SWO's or ESWS, no After-helmsmen, no BMOW's, no Engineering officers of the watch who should have been responsible for aft steering operation. In fact, the ship should have been tied to the pier till the appropriate training and documentation was completed.

So in a sense, the ret Capt is correct, it is an institutional problem but the fact remains, that what is in my afloat experience, a multiple times a week exercise was totally neglected by the command, though "required" for multiple "professional" qualifications and career milestones. For some reason nobody thought to ask why? Or perhaps ask it aloud....

Tragic lack of interest, initiative, and leadership throughout the chain of command.
 
Back
Top Bottom